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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 
Batswana: people who are citizens of Botswana (Allen-lle, 2007). 
 
Conciliation: according to the International Labour Organization (ILO) this refers to means of assisting 
the parties the dispute, through neutral third party intervention, to reach a mutually agreed settlement 
(ILO, 2011). 
Conciliation: In South Africa conciliation means to reconcile or bring together especially opposing 
sides in an industrial dispute. Conciliation is private, confidential and without prejudice (Du Toit,et 
al.,2006). 
Essential services: A service which its interruption will endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
the entire population or part thereof (Bendix, 2010). 
 
Maintenance services: In South Africa a service is a maintenance service if the interruption of that 
service has the effect of material physical destruction to any working area, plant or machinery (Labour 
Relations Act, 1995). 
 
Mediation: according to ILO although conciliation and mediation are sometimes used interchangeably, 
mediation is often distinguished from conciliation as a method of dispute settlement in which   even 
though the dispute is settled by the agreement between parties to the dispute, the third party is more 
active than in conciliation and in some instance this third party can make proposals for settlement of 
the dispute (ILO, 2001). 
Mediation: in Botswana mediation refers to a dispute resolution method which includes facilitation, 
conducting a fact finding exercise, and the making of an advisory award (Trade Dispute Act, 2004). 
 
Trade disputes: this would include an alleged dispute, dispute between unions, a grievance, a dispute 
of interest, or any dispute over the application or the interpretation of any law relating to employment 
(Trade Dispute Act, 2004). 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this study was to compare the dispute resolution systems of Botswana and South Af-
rica. As far as the South Africa dispute resolution system is concerned extensive literature on the sys-
tem was carried out to describe its functioning. As for the  Botswana dispute resolution system there 
was not much written  about it in the literature, so in order to find out more about this system semi-
structured interviews with labour relations experts which include mediators, arbitrators, lecturers 
,labour lawyers, trade unionists, employers and government officials held. The framework of compari-
son was developed to compare the elements of dispute resolution systems against each other and 
secondly to compare each system against the criteria of performance to the system. 
The two labour relations systems were compared in terms of elements of the system and the perfor-
mance of the two systems. In the comparisons of the elements of the systems it was found out that in 
both systems the nature of disputes was collective and individual disputes both of which can be re-
ferred to the initial process of mediation or conciliation. However, in Botswana  collective disputes  
can  only be referred to arbitration if they remain unresolved in mediation while in South Africa  only  
collective  disputes on essential services  go to arbitration while others lead to a strike or lockout if 
unresolved at conciliation. As for coverage both systems have incorporated public service sector em-
ployees in the systems after being excluded from the system for a very long time. The only difference 
is that in Botswana the Police force is not included while in South Africa they are included in the sys-
tem. Differences in the avenues of disputes in the two countries were noted, in Botswana the 
rights/individual disputes go to either arbitration or Industrial Court if unresolved at mediation, inter-
est/collective disputes can only go to arbitration while in South Africa the route of disputes is specified 
in the legislation. As for the human resources of the two countries it was found that the South African 
system has more qualified, trained and sufficiently experienced staff than the Botswana system. As 
for the processes it was found that for South Africa the initial process is conciliation while in Botswana 
it is mediation but these two processes were similar in many ways, from mediation/conciliation the 
next step in both systems is arbitration and just like the conciliation/mediation, arbitration in both 
countries was found to be similar except that in South Africa it is a public hearing. The two systems 
were also compared in terms of their performances and  the research has established that between 
the two systems the South African system proved to be more superior on three of the criteria; efficien-
cy, accessibility and legitimacy than the Botswana system. 
Therefore, the research proposes a number of recommendations for Botswana to implement  namely; 
establishment of a legislated mixed process of mediation-arbitration, making the dispute resolution 
system independent from government, recruitment of high qualified and experienced staff for media-
tion and arbitration, accreditation to private agencies, effective case management system and proper 
routing of disputes. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
1. THE THEORY OF LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
A labour dispute resolution system is part of the labour relation systems practiced in a certain area or 
country. The dispute resolution of system of a country is important because it helps to regulate the 
labour relations system of a country and promotes labour peace. This promotes economic prosperity  
and assists in terms of attracting foreign investment. At the centre of dispute resolution is the term 
„dispute‟ which is differentiated from complaints and grievances. Disputes usually occur when negotia-
tions in the collective bargaining process reach a deadlock and if not resolved this can lead to strikes. 
Therefore, the establishment of an efficient labour dispute resolution system is the foundation of 
sound labour relations policy. 
 
In most countries there are distinctions drawn amongst several different types of disputes and there 
are separate procedures for dealing with them. The two commonly applied distinctions are between 
disputes of right and disputes of interest and individual and collective disputes. Generally rights dis-
putes are disputes which are concerned with the violation of an existing right while interest disputes 
are those which arise because of differences over the determination of future rights and obligations 
emanating from the failure of collective bargaining. Individual disputes involve a single employee 
while collective disputes involve a number of workers collectively. Parties to a dispute ought to first of 
all  exhaust  the dispute  resolution  procedures provided for  by  the collective agreement if it  is a 
collective dispute and if it is an individual dispute there are  dispute resolution procedures  in many 
organisations which may assist parties before they go for external dispute resolution. When all inter-
nal processes have failed a dispute can be referred to alternative dispute resolution processes which 
include conciliation, mediation and arbitration amongst others. 
 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has several conventions and recommendations which 
deal with dispute resolution. The principal among them are the Voluntary Conciliation and Arbitration 
Recommendation, 1951 (No.92) and the Collective Bargaining Recommendation, 1981(No.163) both 
of which have been ratified by both Botswana and South Africa. It is important to note that ILO con-
ventions and recommendations leave enough room for member states to design the dispute resolu-
tion systems suitable for their circumstances but in accordance with the principles that dispute resolu-
tion should be informal, efficient, accessible and affordable. In order to see if a certain dispute resolu-
tion system is performing well there are several measures which are taken. 
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2. LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND BOTSWANA  
 
The earliest attempt to introduce statutory labour dispute resolution in South Africa can be traced to 
1909 when the Transvaal Dispute Prevention Act of 1909 which applied only in the Transvaal was 
promulgated. It was only in 1924 when the first comprehensive piece of labour legislation was passed, 
the Industrial Conciliation Act which by excluding African male workers from the definition of employ-
ee created the racially-dual labour relations system. It also introduced Industrial Councils and ad hoc 
conciliation boards. This was only dismantled in 1979 after the Wiehahn commission recommenda-
tions. The present statutory system in South Africa which is governed by the Labour Relations Act of 
1995 covers both interest and rights disputes as well covering both private and public sector employ-
ees. Dispute Resolution is provided by institutions such as the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration (CCMA), a government funded but independent body which provides conciliation and 
arbitration. Certain disputes must be referred to the Labour Court for adjudication if attempts at concil-
iation fail. Decisions from the Labour Court can be appealed at the Labour Appeals Court (LAC). 
 
In Botswana, before independence, most Batswana were employed in the South African mines and 
there was no labour dispute resolution system which was in place until the early 1980s after phenom-
enal growth of the economy which resulted in significant increases in both informal and formal sector 
employment. As for Botswana the present statutory system is provided under the Ministry of Labour 
and Home Affairs (MLHA). The first process is mediation and if it fails parties can either go to arbitra-
tion or the Industrial Court. The system also covers both interest and rights disputes and cover public 
and private sector employees. 
3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
 
The South Africa dispute resolution system was established in 1995 after the fall of apartheid and the 
designers of the system had the opportunity to benchmark in countries where the labour dispute reso-
lution systems were effective and used what they deemed to be important in the drafting of the sys-
tem. The system was also drafted in accordance to the International Labour Organisation (ILO) con-
ventions. The Botswana dispute resolution system on the other hand is not as developed as the 
South African one despite Botswana attaining independence as far back as 1966.It is important for 
Botswana to develop a dispute resolution system that is aligned with current trends in labour dispute 
resolution. Hence this comparison between the dispute resolution systems  of Botswana and South 
Africa is aimed at identifying  what is good about the South Africa system and  recommending it to 
Botswana and likewise if  there is anything in the Botswana system which can be beneficial to South 
Africa it will be  recommended to the South Africans. In this way this study would be adding value to 
both the Botswana and South African labour dispute resolution systems and contributing positively to 
their development. 
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4. SCHEME OF PAPER 
 
The paper is divided into five chapters with each chapter focusing on a specific theme. The first chap-
ter will focus on the theory of labour dispute resolution and offer a framework for the comparison of 
the two systems. The second chapter will look into the Botswana dispute resolution system, its histo-
ry, present statutory system and the performance of the system. Chapter three will focus on the South 
African labour dispute resolution system, its evolution, current system under the Labour Relations Act 
66 of 1995, private dispute resolution and the review of performance of the system. Chapter four will 
be a comparison of the two systems and the last chapter will present conclusions and recommenda-
tions. 
 Chapters two and three primarily utilise secondary data from the existing literature. However, unlike 
the South African dispute resolution system where the CCMA and Tokiso have undertaken extensive 
reviews of the system, there has been relatively little critical evaluation and review of the Botswana 
system. Therefore, this researcher undertook a series of semi-structured interviews of key informants 
to gather perceptions regarding the current Botswana dispute resolution system. The respondents 
were purposively selected by the researcher from people employed in government, academia, the 
trade union movement, labour law as well as employers. 
The interviews were conducted in September 2011 using the interview guide attached as Appendix 1. 
The list of respondents is shown in Table 1 below. Four of the respondents did not want their names 
and job titles to be mentioned. Most of the interviews were recorded and then later transcribed and 
summarised. The findings from the interviews are incorporated in Chapter 2 in the section on the per-
formance review of the Botswana labour dispute resolution system. 
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Table 1: List of Respondents 
Number  Name  Job Title  Date Inter-
viewed  
1 Ms Tamapo Salani Mediator 14/09/2011 
2 Mr Thusego Ohentse Mediator 14/09/2011 
3 Dr N.Tshabang Lecturer/Unionist 23/09/2011 
4 Mr B.K Kwadipane Arbitrator(part-time) 22/09/2011 
5 Mr S.K Leero Arbitrator(part-time) 22/09/2011 
6 Respondent F  22/09/2011 
7 Dr B.Mothusi Lecturer 20/09/2011 
8 Dr B.Motshegwa Lecturer 19/09/2011 
9 Respondent I  19/09/2011 
10 Mr Mataboge Motsele  Mediator 15/09/2011 
11 Dr T. Tshukudu Lecturer 19/09/2011 
12 Ms Khumo Dira Mediator 15/09/2011 
13 Respondent M  16/09/2011 
14 Respondent N  22/09/2011 
15 Mr Moitshepi Tshipayagae Mediator  23/09/2011 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE THEORY OF LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The labour dispute resolution system in any given country seeks to assist parties in an employment 
relationship to resolve their grievances or disputes in a peaceful and orderly manner through agreed 
machinery with minimum disruption of work (ILO, 2011). 
This chapter will concern itself with discussing conflict in the work place by differentiating  complaints, 
grievances and disputes  as well as identifying types of  disputes which can be either conflicts of in-
terests or of rights or individual  or collective conflicts. This chapter will also look into  the purpose of 
labour dispute resolution, the different dispute resolution processes which can either be extra-judicial 
namely; conciliation, mediation and arbitration or judicial namely; litigation and adjudication and the 
institutions dealing with dispute resolution. Lastly it will also propose a framework for comparing the 
elements of a dispute resolution system and criteria to evaluate the performance of the system that 
will be used to structure chapters two, three and four. 
Conflict can be defined as a process that begins when one party perceives that another party has 
negatively affected or is about to negatively affect something that the first party cares about. Conflict 
may be destructive but may be potentially healthy and even beneficial as, conflict is often a catalyst 
for change, growth and development and without it, the employment relationship system or society, as 
a whole may tend to stagnate. It is therefore believed that conflict is the force underlying transfor-
mation. The challenge is how to approach conflict, manage it and handle it appropriately (Nel, Swa-
nepoel, Kistern, Erasmus &Tsabadi, 2005). 
A grievance is a partly formalised expression of individual or collective conflict, usually involving dis-
satisfaction in respect of workplace related matters .A dispute is a highly formalised manifestation of 
conflict in relation to workplace related matters which may include the failure to address a grievance 
(Brand, Lotter, Mischke & Steadman 1997).Employment disputes are divided into the two main cate-
gories of individual and collective disputes. Individual disputes are disputes which involve a single 
employee while collective disputes involve a group of employees who are usually represented by a 
trade union. Disputes can further be broken into two sub-categories of rights disputes and interests 
disputes. Right disputes relate to a situation whereby there is a disagreement over the implementation 
or interpretation of an existing right and interest disputes usually arise when negotiations in collective 
bargaining fails to yield an agreement. This is basically where there is no collective agreement or it is 
being renegotiated (ILO, 2007). 
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The processes of labour dispute resolution include the extra-judicial processes of conciliation, media-
tion and arbitration. These three methods have one thing in common in that they all involve the inter-
vention of a neutral third party. According to the ILO (2007) the difference between conciliation and 
mediation is that in conciliation the third party just facilitates communication between parties while in 
mediation the third party goes on to propose terms of settlement which can be accepted or rejected 
by the parties. Arbitration on the other hand requires a proposed settlement that may either be com-
pulsory or voluntary, binding or advisory depending on the choice of the parties. In the event that a 
dispute is not resolved by the extra-judicial processes it would be referred to the judicial process and 
be adjudicated by a court. Adjudication is a procedural process whereby a judge or a panel of judges 
decides the case between two parties (Bosch, Molahlehi & Everett, 2004). 
2. CONFLICT AT WORK 
 
According to Bosch et al (2004) conflict is a way of life in the labour relations arena. Therefore the 
labour legislation‟s objective should be to create an environment where conflict is managed so that 
the interests of the parties are advanced and a positive relationship is promoted between them.  Simi-
larly Brand et.al (1997) state that conflict is a part of our working lives so it cannot be avoided or elim-
inated no matter how effective our dispute resolution processes and techniques are. The best that can 
be done is to try and manage it and that is where dispute resolution will play a very important role in 
the management of conflict.  
2.1 Complaints, grievances and disputes 
A complaint is whereby dissatisfaction is expressed but not in a procedural way. Complaints, griev-
ances and disputes are parts of a single process and should not be isolated from one another instead 
they should be interlinked and related. The main distinction between the three is that a dispute can 
only be resolved by the means of formal dispute resolution procedures and processes while handling 
complaints and  grievances need a totally different consideration (Brand et al., 1997). 
A complaint  is where  dissatisfaction is  being expressed  but not in a procedural way while  a 
grievance  is whereby the complainant  is presented formally  and triggers  the procedural machinery. 
The essential difference between a grievance and dispute is usually determined by the way they are 
initiated and in the degree of proposed change in the status quo. By presenting   a grievance this 
shows that the dissatisfaction is serious because this is a formal, drastic step which involves 
questioning the superior‟s judgement. Most people fear it because it often puts one on a collision 
course with the superior.  
The term dispute usually describes a grievance as soon as a union official is involved. However, it is 
still applicable in a non-unionised environment which differentiates between rights disputes and 
interests disputes because issues like unfair dismissal are individual rights disputes. If a union is 
involved and the dispute is a dispute of interest it implies that the issue should be handled by 
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management and union (inter-organisation), and if it is necessary the union may invoke the use of 
industrial action in the event of a continuing failure to agree (Salamon, 2000). 
A grievance is a partly formalised expression of individual or collective conflict which usually 
emanates from dissatisfaction about work-related matters (Salamon, 1992).There are many kinds of 
employee grievances, they range from dissatisfactions with conditions of work and wages, 
promotions, training or unfair treatment in the workplace. This has led to many organisations having 
their own grievance procedures in the workplace. A grievance procedure is a tool which is charged 
with creating communication between employees and employers and making sure that complaints are 
dealt with by management (Bendix, 2001). 
According to Du Toit et al. (2000) a dispute is more than a statement of opposing views about an 
employment issue, it is also more than a claim or demand. The term denotes a situation whereby the 
parties to a dispute have reached an impasse. However, it should be noted that not all labour disputes 
end in the resolution of the dispute. Sometimes one or more parties may simply decide to withdraw 
from the dispute because they lack the interest in pursuing the dispute further (Majinda, 2007). 
 
                              Degree of effect on 
                                     status quo                              
                                                                                   Formality and level of  
                                                                                             Representation   
                                     Matter of Interest 
 
 
 
                                           Matter of right 
 
                                         
                                                                                                               Individual                              Group              All employees            
                                                                                     Extent of employee likely to be affected 
 
Figure 1: Typology of employee dissatisfaction (Adapted from Salamon, 2000 p 554)  
It is often difficult to define the terms grievance and dispute precisely because of the various issues 
and their significance to both employees and management. Figure 1 attempts to show that this variety 
Complaint 
Grievance 
Dispute 
 
Latent  
Dissatisfaction 
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emanates from a number of factors such as nature of issues, extent of satisfaction and the manner of 
representation (Salamon, 2000). 
2.2 Collective and Individual disputes 
An individual dispute is usually a dispute which involves a single worker or a number of workers as 
individuals in the application of their individual employment contacts .A collective dispute on the other 
hand is a dispute which involves a number of workers collectively. The distinction between  collective 
and individual disputes  is not  easy to  draw because  individual disputes  can develop into collective 
disputes at  some point in time particularly when  the trade union  takes over  or when a point of prin-
ciple is involved. Both individual and collective disputes may concern rights because an employee 
may have a dispute about   not being treated according to his contract and a union may be aggrieved 
because it members have not been treated in accordance with the term of the collective agreement. 
Interest disputes are usually collective in character (ILO, 2001). 
2.3 Disputes of Interest and disputes of right 
According to Basson, Christianson, Dekker, Garbers, Le Roux, Mischke & Strydom (2009) a dispute 
of rights is about the interpretation or application of a right that already exists. This is when employees 
and employers do not seek to create a new right, but rather they are seeking to enforce an already 
existing right  that  it is felt the other party in the employment relationship has breached. In terms of 
the ILO, the concept of disputes of rights are sometimes known as legal disputes, which usually in-
volves individual workers or a group of workers who claim that they have not been treated in accord-
ance with rules laid down in collective agreements, individual contracts of employment, or in laws or 
regulations or elsewhere (ILO,2011). 
A dispute of right is the kind of dispute which is usually heard in courts and arbitrations on a daily ba-
sis. It is usually easier to see who is right or wrong in a dispute of right as the arbitrator or judge at the 
court can always refer to the statute, individual contract or collective agreement. The processes of 
adjudication and arbitration are basically rights procedures where parties present their evidence and 
arguments to a neutral third party who has the power to hand down final and binding decisions 
(Majinda, 2007). 
A dispute of interest is usually defined as a dispute which is about the creation of new rights. This dis-
pute arises where employees or trade unions acting on behalf of employees seek to further their in-
terest where there are no currently existing rights which they can enforce. One example would be 
when employees seek higher salaries or when they seek new and improved conditions of employ-
ment such as more leave or shorter working hours for the same pay (Basson et al., 2009). 
Disputes of interest are traditionally and appropriately resolved by the means of interest-based, nego-
tiation, conciliation or mediation and in the final resort by a strike or lockout. Resolving disputes of 
interest is not easy. It involves probing for deep-seated concerns, devising creative solutions and 
making trade-offs and concessions where interests are opposed. Arbitration, adjudication and even 
government action are not normally suited to resolve disputes of interest because the issues involved 
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are usually too wide-ranging and it is very difficult to see who is wrong or right because each particu-
lar case is dependent on whose interest is the cause of the dispute (Majinda, 2007). There are times 
when arbitration can be used to resolve disputes of interest however, this is difficult to do, since it in-
volves deciding the case by making value judgments rather than relying on legal principles (Bosch et 
al., 2004). 
The issues which lead to disputes of interest are those which emanate from problems in collective 
bargaining. Any matter causing conflict between an employer and employee and not regulated by law, 
agreement or custom can give rise to a dispute of interest. Disputes of interest constitute the more 
dynamic aspect of labour relations than disputes of rights, and their settlement requires the estab-
lishment of procedures outside the normal legal machinery (Bendix, 2001). 
According to Du Toit et al. (2000) the main distinction between a disputes of interest  and disputes of 
rights  lies  in the fact that  disputes of rights  involve claims  of rights that can be determined by  the 
application  of mutually binding  standards and  are usually described as more amenable to third party  
decision-making(arbitration or adjudication) than disputes of interest, that are usually open-ended and 
rooted in the exercise of power rather than rights. But for Majinda (2007) the difference between dis-
putes of interest and disputes of right is not always visible especially when it comes to classification of 
cases which have characteristics of both types. For example a dispute which happens to have a rights 
dimension does not mean that it cannot also form the subject of a protected strike or lockout. Where 
there is a provision that entitles a party to refer a dispute of interest to arbitration that party is free to 
choose between arbitration and or strike or lockout. 
It is very important to note that when resolving a dispute the focus may shift from interests to rights to 
power (strikes) and back again. The resolution of disputes of interest takes place within the context of 
the parties „rights and power‟. For example parties may not reach an agreement on the basis of inter-
ests simply because their perceptions of who is right or who is more powerful are different. Similarly, 
the resolution of disputes of right takes place within the context of the parties‟ power. For example a 
party may win a judgment in court but unless the judgment can be enforced against the more powerful 
party that refuses to implement it, the rights disputes will inevitably continue (Majinda, 2007). 
3. THE GOALS OF A DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
According to Thompson (2010) the effectiveness of any dispute resolution system   flows from its le-
gitimacy and this legitimacy flows from the participation of the interested parties in its creation. It 
makes more sense for stakeholders to be involved collaboratively in the design process since in this 
way they become true partners and will have more vested responsibility for the successful operation 
of the system. In terms of a statutory dispute resolution system participation may be achieved through 
the political process but if this arrangement is not possible, it helps if the social partners are directly 
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involved in the making of the relevant governing decision. Countries like Holland with the Social and 
Economic Council and South Africa with the National Economic Development and Labour Council 
have created bodies which deal with this aspect of the involvement of social partners. 
Besides legitimacy Brand, Lotter, Steadman & Ngcukaitobi (2008) identified the following as the five 
goals of a dispute resolution system: 
3.1 Efficiency 
The efficiency of a dispute resolution system refers to disputes being resolved as speedily as possi-
ble. A solution to a labour dispute has to be found as quickly as possible because if it takes too long it 
will negatively affect labour peace in the workplace. The efficiency of dispute resolution machinery is 
very important because when aggrieved parties choose to refer their dispute to the institution they 
expect it to be resolved so that they go on with their lives. However the pursuit of efficiency at all costs 
has been found to be problematic as this can lead to the dispute resolution institutions losing sight of 
their primary function   that of attempting to solve disputes. Efficiency also demands that parties 
should have the confidence to come to the dispute resolution system at short notice and that the insti-
tutions of the systems should be able to respond promptly because if a dispute remains for too long it 
becomes harder to solve. 
3.2 Accessibility 
The accessibility of dispute resolution system means easy access to the dispute resolution centre 
(short travelling distance) and knowing who to approach after getting there. In other words there 
should be minimum fuss when a party needs to approach the dispute resolution system for help. It 
should be clear to the parties as to when it is the right time to involve the dispute resolution system. 
Accessibility also means that employees, employers and the public at large should be aware of and 
understand the system. 
3.3 Informality 
Informality means that parties should be able to come to the dispute resolution institution and be able 
to present their dispute themselves unaided. In alternative dispute resolution the stringent legal and 
procedural formalities which are usually associated with courts of law should not apply. The reason 
why legal representatives are not allowed in the initial process of conciliation or mediation is that by 
their very nature and training legal representatives prefer to stick formalities and are very technical. 
3.4 Affordability 
 It is an accepted view that dispute resolution systems ought to be free or affordable. This is done so 
that everyone, even the poorest people in the society can use this service. However the provision of 
the system comes at a cost because infrastructure and personnel have to be paid for by someone. It 
is usually the state which provides this service to its people using the revenue from the citizens them-
selves. One way of reducing the money spent on the appointment of personnel is to use personnel on 
a non-permanent basis. This is beneficial because in this arrangement the state will only pay for the 
work done and the dispute resolvers do not to leave their jobs elsewhere to come and work for the 
dispute resolution institution. 
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3.5 Expertise 
The quality of the staffing of people in any dispute resolution system usually determines how efficient-
ly a system works. They also determine how employers, employer organisations and trade unions and 
individuals look at the dispute resolution system. Dispute-resolvers need to be well-qualified and be 
highly knowledgeable about the legal frame work within which they are functioning. A dispute-resolver 
should always be sensitive to the nature, extent and consequences of the intervention in a dispute. 
4. NORMATIVE INTERNATIONAL FRAME WORKS 
4.1 ILO Conventions and Recommendations 
As far as ILO conventions and recommendations are concerned there are several which deal with 
dispute resolution. The main ILO instrument dealing with dispute settlement and prevention is Volun-
tary Conciliation and Arbitration Recommendation, 1951 (No.92).According to this recommendation 
voluntary conciliation should be made available to assist in the prevention and resolution of industrial 
disputes between employers and employees. This recommendation goes further to emphasize equal 
representation from both employers and employees and that these procedures should as free and 
quick as possible. It also prohibits parties from being involved in strikes and lockouts whilst concilia-
tion or arbitration is still going on. Another instrument which deals with dispute settlement is the Col-
lective Bargaining Convention of 1981 (No.154).It provides that bodies and procedures for the resolu-
tion of the labour disputes should be designed in such a way that it contributes to the promotion of 
collective bargaining. Although this convention focuses on collective bargaining it does not rule out 
the use of conciliation and arbitration as a part of the bargaining process where such processes are 
voluntary (ILO, 2007). 
As far as public sector is concerned, the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention, 1978 
(No.151) provides that in order to have just and fair  settlement of disputes over the terms and condi-
tions  of employment an independent and impartial machinery for  mediation, conciliation and arbitra-
tion should be established  to ensure the confidence of the parties involved (Thompson,2010). 
4.2 ILO supervisory machinery 
The issue of collective dispute prevention and resolution in the context of the right to strike has been 
addressed by the ILO supervisory bodies. Having to pursue conciliation or arbitration before a strike is 
legitimate but only in so far as these processes are not too complex or slow. If they are, a lawful strike 
may be impossible to practice or may lose its effectiveness. Another concern has been raised regard-
ing compulsory arbitration which results in a binding decision which may prohibit strikes or end them 
quickly. The ILO committee of experts has advised that arbitration ought to be freely chosen and par-
ties should be bound by the final decisions. On top of the various ILO conventions and recommenda-
tions the ILO is involved in a number activities and interventions assisting member states to strength-
en their labour courts, industrial tribunals and dispute resolution systems for efficient, effective and 
equitable labour dispute resolution (Thompson, 2010). 
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5. THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
 
Apart from litigation and other forms of judicial action there are three extra-judicial labour dispute set-
tlement procedures which are usually used in most countries throughout the world; These are concili-
ation, mediation and arbitration. In some countries there is no difference between conciliation and 
mediation, the terms are just used interchangeably but in some there is a distinction between the two. 
According to the ILO (2007) in the descriptions of both processes there is an intervention of a neutral 
third party but in conciliation the conciliator helps to facilitate communication between the two parties, 
without  making any specific proposal  for resolving the  dispute while a mediator in mediation  does 
not only keep the lines of communication open he also  makes proposals to the settlement of the dis-
pute which can be rejected or accepted by the parties. As for arbitration it is a process which also in-
cludes the intervention of a neutral third party but here the third party is empowered to make a binding 
decision after hearing legal arguments and evidence from both parties. 
5.1 Consensus-based processes 
5.1.1 Fact-finding 
One way of adding objectivity in a situation where parties are struggling to reach an agreement and 
where part of the problem can be traced to conflicts over data or perspectives of fairness and afforda-
bility is to undertake a fact finding exercise and then present recommendations (Thompson, 2010). 
According to Brand et al. (2008), in the South African context there is a non-binding fact finding pro-
cess. This is when a conciliator collects information or hears the versions of the parties and then 
makes a non-binding finding on the facts without deciding on the solution to the overall dispute. In a 
situation whereby fact finding is part of conciliation, the power to decide on which procedure to follow 
is usually left to the fact finder and when the parties voluntarily agree to such fact finding, they will set 
the powers of the fact finder. 
 
5.1.2 Facilitation 
In Australia facilitation is a process in which the parties, with the assistance of a dispute resolution 
practitioner, identify problems to be solved, tasks to be accomplished or disputed issues to be re-
solved. Facilitation may end there, or it may go on to help the parties to develop options, consider al-
ternatives and endeavour to reach an agreement. The facilitator has no advisory or determinative role 
on the content of the matters discussed or the outcome of the process, but may advise on or deter-
mine the process of facilitation (National Alternative Dispute Resolution Advisory Council, 2003). Ac-
cording to Brand et al. (2008) facilitation in South Africa involves the use of an independent third par-
ty. It seeks to help the parties reach an agreement without imposing a decision upon the parties. The 
difference between facilitation and conciliation is that conciliation focus on disputes and all the parties 
agree to go to conciliation or one party forces the other into the conciliation. Facilitations focus on 
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structural and relationship issues as the third party helps to identify parties to the facilitation and then 
persuades them to come to the table (Du Toit, 2006). 
5.1.3 Conciliation and Mediation 
 These processes may either be voluntary or involuntary. It is voluntary when the parties have re-
course to decide whether to make use of the processes or not and when the processes are undertak-
en by a private party who has been mutually agreed upon by the two parties outside the machinery 
provided for by the government. It is compulsory when the law requires the parties to consent to the 
use of conciliation or mediation. In most countries conciliation is undertaken by a government concilia-
tion service and sometimes by labour inspectors. In order to inspire confidence in the parties that 
there is neutrality in the conciliation machinery and thus create legitimacy, some countries have es-
tablished independent conciliation bodies by statute. These countries include South Africa (the Com-
mission of Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration), Ireland (the Labour Relations Commission), Den-
mark (the Conciliation Board), the United Kingdom (the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Ser-
vice), and the United States of America (the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service) (ILO, 2001). 
Taking the example of South Africa, conciliation is a process whereby a neutral third party not in-
volved in the dispute tries to assist the parties to reach their own settlement of the dispute. The concil-
iator leads and tries to persuade the parties to settle the dispute themselves. It is usually the first step 
in the dispute resolution process with the hope that most disputes will be resolved here thereby leav-
ing a small number of disputes to be resolved by arbitration, adjudication or strikes and lock-outs.  
Often enough the terms conciliation, mediation and non-binding fact finding are used interchangeably 
because in all three cases settlement of the dispute depends upon the agreement of the par-
ties(Basson et al.,2009). 
For Du Toit et al (2000) conciliation means to reconcile or bring together especially opposing sides in 
an industrial dispute. It is very private, confidential and without prejudice by its own nature. The prima-
ry role of a conciliator is to help parties resolve their disputes themselves by devising a process that 
the conciliator deems appropriate. According to Bosch et al (2004) a mediator or conciliator brings the 
parties to the table and facilitates discussion between them. The conciliator further plays a very active 
role in helping the parties to come up with options, consider alternatives and reach a settlement that 
will address both parties‟ needs. 
Steadman (2008) compared conciliation and mediation in three countries namely Canada, Indonesia 
and Trinidad and Tobago. In Canada conciliation and mediation are the primary labour disputes set-
tlement processes available for collective bargaining disputes at federal level. Conciliation is per-
formed by conciliation officers appointed by the Minister of Labour and must be conducted before an 
industrial action or lockout can be declared to be lawful. It may take up to 60 days and if there is a 
need to extend the period it is up to the parties to mutually agree to do that. The Minister of Labour 
can appoint a mediator at any time either at the request of the parties or at his own initiative. Media-
tion appointments are usually done after the completion of formal conciliation procedures. The ap-
14 
 
 
pointment of mediators does not limit the right to strike or lockout. In Indonesia mediation is used to 
resolve disputes of interest, disputes of right, disputes of termination of contract and disputes involv-
ing trade unions in one company. The mediator is  appointed  by the Minister and his role is to inves-
tigate  a dispute  and  conduct a hearing  and in the event that  he fails to resolve the dispute he has 
to write down recommendations to the parties as to how to settle the dispute, conciliation on the other 
hand  does not  resolve disputes of right. In Trinidad and Tobago Conciliation is the first step for re-
solving trade disputes. It is compulsory in the sense that all disputes must first be referred to the Min-
istry of Labour for conciliation before industrial action or adjudication in the industrial court can take 
place. The Ministry of Labour with its free provision of voluntary conciliation services is the principal 
third party in the settlement of both individual and collective disputes. 
In Australia the legislation requires a number of agencies to employ mediation or conciliation either as 
a process preceding arbitration or adjudication or as the only process available. Mediation is said to 
be more suitable for disputes of interests than disputes of rights. It is also recommended for parties 
which are in a relationship. Mediation claims to be an efficient form of dispute resolution in at least 
three ways, the first being direct expenditure on preparation, lawyers and experts which is considera-
bly lower than in litigation; secondly mediation is credited for saving time because of its likelihood to 
go ahead on the appointed day, being able to commence without delays and potentially short duration 
of the process and the third measure of efficiency relates to the parties‟ abilities to take advantage of 
all the potential value which is at the bargaining table (Boulle & Rycroft, 1997). 
Southern Africa benefited immensely from the post-apartheid establishment of the Commission of 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) which was set up shortly after the new democratic 
government took over in the mid-1990s.The ILO working with representatives from government, la-
bour and business in South Africa helped to establish the CCMA as an independent institution of set-
tlement. The core feature of this institution is the compulsory conciliation of all disputes whether they 
are collective or individual or interest or right disputes. The CCMA model has inspired six countries in 
Southern Africa to build labour dispute settlement institutions of their own. These countries include 
Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. In each of these countries dis-
pute resolution systems have been designed in such a way that consensus-building processes like 
negotiation, conciliation and mediation take precedence over more adjudicative ones like arbitration 
and judicial courts (Steadman, 2008). 
5.2 Referral-based Processes 
5.2.1 Arbitration 
There are two types of arbitration namely compulsory and voluntary arbitration. Voluntary arbitration is 
the most widely used form of arbitration. It occurs when a dispute settlement system which has been 
established by legislation makes a provision for the voluntary submission of disputes to a legally bind-
ing arbitration. There are several ways of encouraging and promoting this type of arbitration. These 
include making arbitration awards legally binding to parties, giving it statutory basis and providing ma-
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chinery and facilities for arbitration. Compulsory arbitration on the other hand is when the dispute is 
referred to arbitration for settlement by a way of a binding award, without the consent of all the parties 
involved. This type of arbitration undermines collective bargaining and reduces the willingness of par-
ties to accept compromises which are vital for effective collective bargaining (ILO, 2001). 
Boulle & Rycroft (1997) state that in Australia  arbitration involves the submission  of a dispute to an 
arbitrator who  resolves it by making a binding decision called an award which can be enforceable  
through the courts and it is not subject  to appeal or review unless  the arbitrator has committed a  
misconduct. Although arbitration shares with mediation greater potential flexibility and greater party 
control than the formal court system, arbitration has a close association with the court system in terms 
of the parties‟ ability to obtain court orders in order to assist the arbitration and to secure direct court 
enforcement of arbitral awards.  
In South Africa arbitration refers to the appointment of a third party to act as an adjudicator in a dis-
pute and to decide on the terms of settlement. The difference between arbitration and conciliation or 
mediation is that arbitration does not promote the continuation of collective bargaining. The third party 
in arbitration actively intervenes and takes up the role of decision-maker. The arbitrator listens careful-
ly and investigates the demands and counter-demands on both sides, and decides on a final settle-
ment. Parties may submit their individual proposals for a settlement to the arbitrator but the final deci-
sion lies with the arbitrator and whatever decision is made, it is binding on the parties concerned 
(Bendix, 2001). 
In Canada arbitration takes place in the Ministry of Labour. The minister appoints an adjudicator who 
is charged with determining individual disputes of right for federal employees including allegation s of 
wrongful dismissal. The decisions of these adjudicators are final and binding and there is no right to 
appeal or review (Steadman, 2008). In the United States of America arbitration is credited for minimiz-
ing pre-hearing processes like discovery, motion practices and the other preliminary issues that ex-
tend the time, expense and anxiety of litigation costs. On top of that it provides a lower cost, less 
complex and more expeditious alternative to traditional litigation for adjudicating employer/employee 
disputes to a binding result (Hayford, 2000). 
a) Voluntary arbitration 
This is the step which comes directly after mediation has failed in the dispute resolution chain. It is 
when the parties after realising that they cannot resolve their dispute on their own, decide that the 
only way to reach an agreement in their particular dispute is to employ the services of an independent 
third party. The arbitrator gets his powers from either a written contact (the deed of submission to ar-
bitration) or a statute to consider evidence and arguments of both parties and then make a final bind-
ing decision on the matter in dispute (Thompson,2010). 
b) Compulsory arbitration 
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The costs associated with strikes can be very high to bear, so legislators may decide to restrict such 
action in critical areas of the public service by introducing compulsory arbitration. This process should 
be handled with caution because it can take away collective bargaining‟s vitality and equity (Thomp-
son, 2010). 
According to Venter, Levy, Conradie & Holtzhausen (2009) in the South African context compulsory 
arbitration may take place either in terms of a collective agreement that mandates arbitration as part 
of the collective bargaining process, or in terms of section 136 of the Labour Relations Act. The act 
clearly stipulates that arbitration is compulsory in that if mediation fails parties are compelled to go for 
arbitration. 
5.2.2 Adjudication 
This is a procedure whereby the courts are used to resolve any dispute of right channeled through to 
them. In this process then stringent procedures are highly structured and institutionalised with detailed 
rules and numerous compliance mechanisms. The parties to the dispute incur the costs and delays 
normally associated with the judicial procedure. Court adjudications yield final and binding decisions 
or judgments which are appealable (Majinda, 2007). In reaching his or her decision, the adjudicator is 
expected to make a principled and reasoned decision based on legal norms. The trial judge‟s deci-
sions are binding on the parties and subject to appeal to a higher court. Adjudication is a public pro-
cess since the judge is a public official and the proceedings are ordinarily open to the public and not 
confidential (Mnookin, 1998). 
Adjudication is a dispute resolution system in which the official courts in a country impose a binding 
decision on the disputants. It is a formal system regulated by rules of evidence, procedure and direc-
tions from the courts. It is an  adversarial system  which  signifies that parties themselves  define the 
dispute  and present the evidence and all the court has to do is to  decide  on the basis of the evi-
dence and arguments presented. One major difference between adjudication and processes of concil-
iation and mediation relate to what information and evidence can be used and how it can be present-
ed and tested. In adjudication it is regulated by evidential and procedural rules on relevance and reli-
ability unlike what happens in mediation where there are no rules of evidence and there is no scope 
for cross-examination and procedural point-taking. The traditional model of litigation does not provide 
for extensive and direct participation of parties in the process instead it allows limited and structured 
participation by parties with legal interest in the outcome (Boulle &Rycroft, 1997). 
5.3 Mixed Processes 
5.3.1 Mediation-arbitration/Conciliation-arbitration 
In many systems across the world a fused or directly connected two-stage process of mediation and 
arbitration has begun to emerge across the private and public sectors. This innovation has been 
backed by practitioners and users of the dispute resolution systems because it saves costs and time 
but there are those who  express professional misgivings for this practice provides for the same per-
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son to perform both mediation and arbitration. They contend that mediation needs enough time for the 
parties to really try to reach an agreement and using the med-arb model may rush this process. They 
also feel that if a dispute has failed in mediation it needs a fresh, independent third party in arbitration 
who was not involved in mediation. This model is used in South Africa, as well as in Australia in a 
number of employment settings both public and private sector. In the state of New South Wales, dis-
putes regarding worker compensation first proceed to conciliation usually in a telephone conference 
environment but if the matters remain unresolved it goes to arbitration (Thompson, 2010). 
5.3.2 Arbitration-Mediation/conciliation 
This is when  an arbitrator reaches a decision in arbitration then does not disclose it to the parties but  
goes to mediation or conciliation  in an attempt to  persuade them into a voluntary settlement of the 
own (Bendix,2001). 
6. AVENUES OF A DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
6.1 Legislation 
Every country has legislative rules for dispute resolution covering individual and collective disputes. In 
some countries this framework is part of the country‟s general labour law while in other countries la-
bour regulation rules are just scattered all over different statutes or regulations which  govern labour 
relations. Still, there are other countries which adopt singular pieces of legislation that specifically deal 
with dispute resolution. Whichever form they take, dispute resolution laws address common issues   
which include the status of the parties in a dispute and their corresponding rights and obligations in 
the duration of the dispute. The rules that apply to public dispute resolution often differ from those 
which apply to the private sector. This is because governments feel that public employees provide 
essential services that require more rigorous dispute resolution arrangements so that the health and 
safety of the whole society is not compromised. However industrial action among public employees in 
the police, military and emergency services is restricted if not outlawed altogether (ILO, 2007). 
6.2 Dispute Resolution Agencies 
In almost all the countries in the world labour disputes may be dealt with under the formal court sys-
tem. However, many countries have developed dedicated agencies for labour dispute resolution. La-
bour disputes can be handled in public dispute resolution agencies or private agencies. 
6.2.1 Public dispute resolution agencies 
 According to Thompson (2010) if state labour agencies are to operate effective, it is vital that they 
display certain key procedural and substantive qualities which include: 
a) Legitimacy 
It is important to have the system within which the agency operates to be the product of the consent 
of the parties whose interests are at stake, as well as having the substantive standards which are to 
be applied satisfying public interest norms and standards. 
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b) Powers 
 Ideally the system must be capable of bringing the full alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes 
(mediation, arbitration and others) to the resolution of the issue at hand if it is appropriate. 
c) Scope 
 The system need to be able to cover the full range of interests of rightful concern to the parties to-
gether with the attendant issues that give rise to conflict in the workplace. 
d) Independence 
 It is very important for any organisation which houses facilitators, mediators and arbitrators of any 
conflict resolution arrangement to be seen to be clearly independent and without any conflicts of in-
terest in relation to the parties or subject-matter. The appointment of the neutrals must be the product 
of either general or specific consent. 
e) Professionalism 
The users of a dispute resolution system must be confident that the service thrives under an ethically 
sound governance structure and that the providers of this service are sufficiently experienced and 
competent people. 
f) Coordination and integration 
A private or sectoral dispute resolution process needs to be compatible with the wider workplace 
regulation system. The statutory and the private dispute resolution systems should complement each 
other, and should not in any event undermine one another. 
6.2.2 Private dispute resolution agencies 
These play an important supplementary role in dispute resolution. They have benefits which include 
privacy, informality, speed and focus on substance rather than form. These agencies are usually cost-
effective even if they are not publicly subsidized. Good examples can be found in South Africa, Cana-
da and United States of America (Thompson, 2010).In South Africa there is Tokiso Dispute Settle-
ment (Pty) Ltd which is South Africa‟s largest and most active private dispute resolution service in the 
labour field. 
 
7. FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON 
 
The framework for comparison outlines the elements of a dispute resolution system which include the 
nature of the dispute, coverage, processes, avenues, and human resources. It also presents efficien-
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cy, legitimacy, accessibility, informality and costs as five criteria to evaluate performance of the sys-
tem. The framework will be used to structure chapters two, three and four 
Table 2: Framework for comparison, elements and performance criteria 
Elements of the system 
The nature of the dispute  Individual and collective;  rights and interests 
Coverage   Public; private; workers excluded  
Processes Extra-judicial; judicial  
Avenues of dispute resolution  The nature of institutions both judicial and ex-
tra-judicial  
Routing of disputes   
Human Resources  Personnel within the system  
 
Performance of the system 
Key Criteria Possible indicators 
Legitimacy   Stakeholders to the design of the system 
 Independence of the institutions  
 Professionalism of the providers  
 Clear and consistent standards and decision  
 The delivery of just and fair decisions  
Efficiency  
 
 Speed of resolution within the system 
 Prompt response to all cases      
 Prompt response to emergency cases  
Accessibility   Awareness and understanding of the system by employers, em-
ployees and the general public 
 A dispute resolution office within a reasonable travelling distance  
 A case –management service  
Informality   A minimum of procedural formalities  
 A minimum of legal formality  
 The opportunity for parties to represent themselves at the entry 
level  
Affordability  Free or inexpensive for the users  
Expertise   Suitability qualified personnel at every point in the system  
8. CONCLUSION 
Labour conflict expressed as complaints grievances, and disputes are inherent in a labour relations 
system. It must be noted that in any employment relationship there are always going to be conflicts 
which if not managed well will lead to unrest and possibly strikes and lock-outs which will in turn affect 
the economy of a country negatively. In the interest of maintaining a good industrial climate in a coun-
try there should be promotion of collective bargaining and the establishment of a sound system of 
prevention and settlement of labour disputes. Knowing the difference between disputes of interest and 
disputes of rights will enable the parties to know which channels they should follow if they have a dis-
pute 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE BOTSWANA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Botswana is a landlocked country bordered by South Africa to the south, Namibia to west and the 
north, Zimbabwe to the east and Zambia to the north. The territory where Botswana is today was col-
onised by Britain in 1885 and was then called The Bechuanaland Protectorate until the attainment of 
independence in 1966.It was not a united nation at the time rather it was a collection of tribes living 
alongside each other under the rule of their respective chiefs. The territory was under the authority of 
the High Commissioner (HC) of the Colony of the Cape (Ntumy, 1999). 
Throughout the colonial period the Batswana were known to be avid farmers who were involved in 
cattle rearing and subsistence farming. After sometime their involvement in agriculture began to dwin-
dle as more and more healthy, strong young men migrated to work in South African mines as the min-
ing trade was booming at the turn of the century (Ntumy, 1999).According to Mogalakwe (2008) in 
1966 when Botswana attained independence Botswana was ranked as one of the poorest countries in 
the world. The British imperialists never really developed the country because they saw it as a labour 
reserve for the mining industry in South Africa. There was no physical, social or economic infrastruc-
ture except for the single line railway track built by the British South Africa Company in their quest to 
link the Cape Colony with Southern Rhodesia in 1890. 
It was only after the discovery of diamonds in Botswana in the 1970s that the economy began to grow 
and as a result employment also grew and the need to regulate employment became inevitable. Prior 
to the discovery of diamonds, employment had been regulated  by the Employment Act of 1963 and in 
1969  two further pieces of labour legislation had been passed; The Trade  Unions Act (24 of 1969) 
and the  Trade Disputes Act (28 of 1969).After the rapid economic  growth of the 1970s,  the 1982/83 
amendments followed  which included; the new Employment Act (no.29 of 1982), the Trade  Disputes 
Act (no.19 of1982) and the new Trade Unions and Employers Organisation Act(1983).The Employ-
ment Act of 1982 in section 27 addressed the  issue of the settlement  of  labour disputes by stating 
that the Department of Labour and Social Security (D.L.S.S)  through  Labour Officers (LO) had the 
responsibility to handle all grievances and trade disputes including cases of unfair dismissal (Kupe-
Kalonda,2001).According to Takirambudde and  Molokomme (1994) ten years  later in 1992  new re-
forms were introduced with the  aim of lessening the intervention of the state in the resolution of la-
bour disputes. Through these changes the role of labour officers was reduced to a more mediatory 
one and the Industrial Court was established as the arbiter of all trade disputes in the country. Further 
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reforms in  2003/2004  brought changes to the dispute resolution  machinery, when a panel of media-
tors and  arbitrators was created  and as a result a clear structure for resolution of trade disputes in 
Botswana was created  with the initial step being  mediation and if  the dispute remains unresolved 
the parties to the dispute can refer it to  arbitration  or to the industrial court. 
2 .BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
2.1 The pre-independence era 1885-1966 
The Bechuanaland Protectorate as Botswana was known before independence did not have much 
regulation in the labour field mainly because the colonial masters did not introduce innovations in the 
economy and in industrialisation in particular. In fact Botswana was just a labour reserve for the gold 
mines in the Witwatersrand (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1994). 
According Ntumy (1999) during the period between 1930 and 1966 there were several laws regulating 
labour to which the Bechuanaland protectorate was party. These included The African Labour Proc-
lamation (56 of 1941) which was intended to regulate and control the recruitment of African labour. 
Wage advances for Africans were restricted to four pounds and desertion from work was penalised by 
two months imprisonment or ten pounds fine. The Works and Machinery Proclamation (40 of 1934) 
dealt with processes associated with production, manufacturing, mining and issues of safety, health 
and inspection. The Women and Boys Underground Work Proclamation (74 of 1936) prohibited em-
ployment of females and boys below 16 years in underground mines. The Workmen’s Compensation 
Proclamation (28 of 1936(6) was introduced to protect employees in case they died or were injured in 
the line of duty (a workman was defined as a worker under contract of service or an apprentice).The 
Wages Act (20 of 1936)(8) called for the formation of a Wages Board (Cap 161) and minimum wages 
were prescribed for some sectors; The Shop Hours Proclamation (72 of 1941) prescribed strict busi-
ness hours for shops. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation( of 1942) legalised trade 
unions and provide limited protection for   workers but it neglected to set out an adequate provision for 
the settlement of trade disputes. Finally, to consolidate and regulate conditions of work the then Leg-
islative Council of Bechuanaland Protectorate came up with The Employment Law (15 of 1963) prior 
to independence. It repealed all the proclamations before it. 
2.2 The Post-independence era (1966-1992) 
After independence Botswana„s economic difficulties were labeled as chronic, the country was ranked 
amongst the poorest nations in the world and in some quarters it was even referred to as “a hopeless 
basket case” (Mogalakwe, 2008). Although most Batswana were involved in agriculture, the cattle in 
the country were of a very poor grade and agricultural land only yielded a crop every three years due 
to persistent drought and low, unreliable rainfall (Du Toit, 2006). The political economy at the time 
was still very much that of a labour reserve country, social services were under-developed and the 
population was young and rural with very few opportunities of work in the country. It was estimated 
that at the time  the country had  only four-fifths of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Lesotho, 
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three quarters  of that of Swaziland , a quarter of that of Malawi  and South Africa as the regional 
power had a GDP 234 times bigger than that of Botswana (Parsons,1993). 
The new post-colonial government of Sir Seretse Khama embarked on a policy of economic devel-
opment in order to undo the total neglect by the colonial masters as far as development was con-
cerned, be it physical, social or economic. The industrial development policy was firmly based on a 
highly regulatory and central role for the state. In the sphere of labour relations the government had 
the overall responsibility to regulate the labour market and to intervene in the resolution of both indi-
vidual and collective grievances and disputes (Kalula, 1993). 
The attainment of independence did not bring about an immediate change in the labour legislation 
framework of the country. The Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation of 1942 and the Em-
ployment Law (15 of 1963) which were passed in the colonial era were still in place and since there 
was not much happening in terms of industry it made sense not to change the laws immediately after 
independence. In time the need to update the labour laws grew and two new pieces of legislation 
were passed in 1969, the Trade Unions Act (24 of 1969) and the Trade Disputes Act (28 of 1969) 
were passed (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1994). 
In the 1970‟s diamonds were discovered in Botswana and the economy grew in leaps and bounds. 
Roads, education, health and water provision improved dramatically as did formal employment. By 
1980 the World Bank called Botswana the best economic performer in Africa (Du Toit, 2006).The 
1980s saw further dramatic growth in the Botswana economy as rapid developments inspired by the 
diamond mining industry and changes in social and political behaviour began to show. This signaled 
that Botswana could no longer be referred to  as a rural economy  based on subsistence  agriculture 
especially since  about a third of  the labour force was now in formal  sector employment (Kalu-
la,1993).This meant that  the Acts passed in 1969 were overtaken by developments  in the economy. 
The government introduced amendments to the existing labour laws in 1982/83.In came the  total 
overhaul of the Employment Act, a comprehensive Trade Dispute Act  and Trade Unions and Em-
ployers Organisations Act which now included employer  organisations (Takirambudde & Molo-
komme, 1994). 
2.2.1 Employment Act of 1982 (No.29) 
This Act came into force on 14 December 1984 and it aimed to provide  a link between  the state and 
the employee in the form of minimum floor of rights  which adhered to a  set of  labour standards 
(Kupe-kalonda,2001).In this Act  an employee was defined as a person who  has either before or after 
its commencement ,entered into a contract of employment  for the hire of his  labour. This definition 
excluded public servants unless they belonged to a category of those public officers who were de-
clared by the minister to be employees through a government gazette for the purposes of the Act 
(Kalula, 1993). 
Section 27 of the Act addressed the issue of dispute resolution in that it directed that employees could 
file a protest with the Department of Labour at the District Labour Office (DLO) nearest to where they 
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lived. Labour officers were given the power to fine employers if after their investigations they conclud-
ed that the dismissal of an employee was unfair (Kupe-Kalonda, 2001).According to Kalula (1993) the 
Employment Act of 1982 created a Labour Officer‟s Court because Labour Officers were granted the 
powers of a Magistrate grade 1 by being given the responsibility to determine whether the dismissal 
was fair or unfair. The problem was that this put labour officers who were without any legal training in 
a position where they were prosecutors, judges and the jury. Labour officers became the only officers 
outside the judiciary to have such powers. This was problematic because their qualifications did not 
match the responsibilities they had been given. For one to be employed as a labour officer tertiary 
education was not a prerequisite. 
2.2.2 The Trade Disputes Act of 1982 (No.19) 
This Act came into effect in 1983 and it introduced elaborate rules relating to the control of trade dis-
putes .The Act established a quasi-judicial mechanism in the form of the Permanent Arbitrator‟s office 
which was established to resolve all collective trade disputes, but it was never functional as it grap-
pled with the lack of adequate resources, supporting mechanism and legitimacy (Kupe-
Kalonda,2001).According to the Act industrial action  was legal  but its legality was dependant  on the 
proper  application of  the elaborate  rules prescribed  by the Act. Strikes ,in the form of secondary 
strikes  not strictly related  to the employee –employer relationship of the parties involved were out-
lawed. Also outlawed were the solidarity and general strikes and some restrictions were imposed on 
some forms of picketing (Kalula, 1993). 
2.2.3 Trade Unions and Employers Organisations Act 1983 (No.23) 
This Act provided the means by which government could regulate trade unions activity as well as set-
ting specific rules by which trade unions and employer organisations should abide. These rules mostly 
related to the formation and registration of trade unions. The Act also placed some restrictions on un-
ion membership, office-holding, external affiliation and receiving donations from beyond Botswana‟s 
borders (Kupe-Kalonda, 2001).According to Takirambudde and Molokomme (1994) this Act brought a 
tight legal structure which allowed intrusive government control. For example  section 30  empowered 
the Minister  to attend  every meeting  of the body  in which  the ultimate  authority  of a registered 
trade union or federation was based  and of the federation‟s executive committee. The other example 
is in section 51 which empowered the Minister to appoint the Minister‟s commissioner to assume the 
management of a registered trade union or federation of trade unions if he was of the opinion that the 
affairs of the union were being conducted without any regard to sound financial management. 
2.3 The 1992 reforms  
In 1992 parliament adopted legislation which radically changed the industrial relations framework in 
Botswana. The most significant changes were in the dispute resolution mechanism. These reforms 
introduced an independent Industrial Court system which replaced the Department of Labour and So-
cial Security as the arbiter of both individual disputes and grievances (as per Employment Act) and 
also dealt with collective trade disputes (in the Trade Disputes Act) which were previously referred to 
the government appointed arbitrators (Kalula, 1993).  
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In the Employment Act of 1982 individual disputes and grievances, most of which were dismissal cas-
es, were decided by labour officers who were given judicial powers to determine these cases. Now 
after the amendments made to the Employment Act the officers retained their power to hear cases but 
the role of labour officers was reduced to a mediatory one. If the dispute was not resolved at media-
tion either party could refer the dispute to the Industrial Court (Kalula, 1993). 
2.3.1 Employment (Amendment) Act of 1992 
Apart from the establishment of the Industrial Court and the reduction of powers of labour officers, the 
Act addressed several unsatisfactory features of the 1982 Employment Act such as inequality which 
placed restrictions on women when it came to certain types of jobs and the fact that the Act had failed 
to provide for the  enforcement of  the obligations of  the employer (Kupe-Kalonda,2001).The 
amendments primarily affected   five  aspects  of the Act namely; the right to work and job security, 
sexist provisions, aspects of work obligations, remedies and jurisdiction of labour department and 
lastly changes  at work  with reference to severance benefits (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1994). 
2.3.2 Trade Disputes (Amendment) Act of 1992 
 The amendment of the Trade Disputes Act provided for the consolidation of all procedures leading to 
a situation whereby all disputes arising from employment were subject to the governance of the Trade 
Disputes Act. Section 5 of the Act directed that the initial reporting of a grievance or an unfair dismis-
sal should be made at the nearest labour office within the prescribed  14 days and  if the settlement  
of the dispute was not  achieved  the matter would be referred  to the Commissioner  of Labour  who 
had  21 days to settle the matter .If the dispute was  still unresolved  the Commissioner was required 
to  issue a  section 7  certificate  which allowed  either party  or both parties  to refer  the matter to the 
Industrial Court (Kupe-Kalonda,2001). 
2.3.3 Trade Unions and Employers Organisations (Amendment) Act of 1992 
The 1992 amendments to this Act sought to relax the intrusive and restrictive provisions in the princi-
pal legislation. These relaxations related to limitations on membership of trade unions, restrictions on 
office-holding and the provision for a minister‟s representatives  on the relevant  committees of a trade 
union or  federation. A new provision was inserted which called on the minister to appoint an investi-
gator who could investigate the membership of  a trade union  or maybe  even carry out that investi-
gation himself (Takirambudde & Molokomme, 1994).  
 
2.3.4 Establishment of the Industrial Court 
 The 1992 labour reforms called for the establishment of an Industrial Court. This represented a 
landmark moment in the country‟s labour relations history since no specialised body designed to en-
force the settlement of labour disputes had existed before (Kupe-Kalonda, 2001).Kalula (1993) stated 
that the court was to be headed by a judge who enjoyed the same power and privileges as a judge in 
the high court of Botswana. The court had two assessors, selected from the panels nominated by 
trade union movements and employers‟ organisations. The court‟s jurisdiction was to; 
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 Hear and determine all labour disputes properly referred to it. 
 Refer any matter to an expert, and at its discretion, accept the report of an expert as evi-
dence. 
 Enjoin any employer or employee or any trade union or employer organisation from taking or 
continuing industrial action. 
 Do whatever was necessary for the expeditious and just hearing and determination of any 
trade dispute before it. 
3. THE PRESENT STATUTORY SYSTEM FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
3.1 Amendments of 2003/2004 
Further changes were made to the major Acts in 2003/04. 
 In the Employment Act (1992) section 92(A) was inserted after section 92 and it addresses the situa-
tion whereby when the employer is insolvent, an employee‟s claims arising from his employment 
should be paid out of the assets of the insolvent employer before non-privileged creditors are paid 
their shares. This protection extends to ;a) employee claiming up to three months in wages prior to 
the insolvency)severance benefits and c) other terminal benefits which the employee is entitled 
to,c)the  employee‟s claim of  work performed on holidays within a period of 24 months before insol-
vency (Employment Act,2004). 
The Trade Disputes Act of 1992 was amended to provide for the general resolution of trade disputes 
including the resolution of disputes in essential services. The other duty is to control and regulate in-
dustrial action and related matters. In section 3 of the Act the minister appoints a panel of mediators 
and arbitrators with the Commissioner of Labour as their chairman. Section 7 sets out the procedure 
of reporting a trade dispute; section 8 outlines the process of mediation while section 9 outlines that of 
arbitration (Trade Dispute Act, 2004). 
The Trade Unions and Employers Organisation Act received many amendments with one of the most 
important being that the definition of an „employee‟ was extended to include public officers. This 
meant that for the first time all public officers were allowed to join trade unions except for the disci-
plined forces (the police and the army). Other changes included providing recognition of the union in 
the workplaces where the union represents a third of the employer‟s employees, providing recognition 
at the industry if the members of the trade union are at least a third of all employees in an industry 
and the provision of relevant information by an employer to a recognised trade union in order to help 
collective bargaining between the two parties (Trade Unions and Employer‟s Act, 2003). 
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3.2 Establishment of a panel of mediators and arbitrators 
Apart from providing resolution of disputes in essential services Section 3 of the amended Trade Dis-
putes Act of 2004 calls for the establishment of a panel of mediators and arbitrators with the Commis-
sioner of Labour as the chairman of this panel. The minister may appoint mediators and arbitrators 
with expertise in law or labour relations or other specialist areas of expertise to the panel. The panel 
of mediators and arbitrators shall be subject only to the control and direction of the Commissioner and 
anyone who obstructs them in the performance of their duties commits an offence and is liable to a 
fine of 1000.00 (pulas) or to imprisonment for six months or both.  
This panel includes part-time mediators, full-time mediators, part-time arbitrators and full-time arbitra-
tors. Full-time mediators are mostly university graduates with qualifications in human resources man-
agement, labour relations or social sciences. Part-time mediators are people with qualifications and 
experience in labour relations. Most of them have their own labour relations consultancy companies 
while some hold key labour relations positions in the private sector. There are only six full-time arbitra-
tors but they rarely do arbitrate because they already have other duties which they do full-time. They 
include the Commissioner and senior management staff in the Department of Labour and Social Se-
curity. They hold arbitration qualifications from the University of Namibia. Like part-mediators, part-
time arbitrators are people with expertise in the labour relations field, these include; labour lawyers, 
human resource managers from companies in the private sector and labour consultants (DLSS Annu-
al Report, 2006). 
3.3 Referral of disputes to the Commissioner 
Section 7 of Trade Disputes Act (2004) states that a party to a dispute may refer the dispute to the 
Commissioner or a labour officer designated by the Commissioner and if the dispute concerns termi-
nation of employment it should be referred within 30 days of the date of such termination. A party re-
ferring the dispute shall satisfy the commissioner, in writing, that a copy of the referral has been 
served on the other party to the dispute unless the commissioner is satisfied that it was not possible 
to serve the referral on the other party. An employee who cannot read or write may refer the dispute 
orally and the Commissioner of Labour or the Labour officer designated by the commissioner shall 
complete the prescribed form on the employee‟s behalf. Sub-section 5 continues to state that upon 
receiving the matter the Commissioner or the designated labour officer shall assign a mediator from 
the panel to attempt to resolve this dispute through mediation, secondly determine the venue, date 
and time of the first mediation meeting and lastly  inform the parties to the dispute  in writing about the 
details mentioned above. 
3.4 The Mediation Process 
A mediator shall attempt to mediate a dispute referred to him or her within the 30 days of the dispute 
being received by the Commissioner or a Labour Officer designated in terms of section 7.This period 
may be extended by an agreement between the parties to the dispute or a collective agreement. If the 
mediator fails to resolve the dispute in the stipulated time frame, the parties to the dispute may refer it 
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to arbitration or the Industrial Court. Sub-section 5 of Section 8 of the Trade Disputes Act (2004) di-
rects that a mediator in dealing with a dispute assigned to him may: 
a) Determine any question concerning- 
 whether  a dispute has been  referred in terms of Section 7; 
 the date on which the dispute was referred; or 
 the jurisdiction of the mediator to mediate 
b) Allow for any application for condonation of late referral, if the applicant shows good cause for such 
late referral 
c) Dismiss a referral if the referring party fails to come to the mediation meeting 
d) If satisfied that a referral has been served but the party who has been served does not appear for 
mediation the mediator gives a default award  
e) Reverse on good cause- 
 any dismissal of a referral, or 
 default award  
f) Recommend a settlement 
g) Make an advisory award if – 
 the parties request it 
 it is in the interest of settlements to do so 
A decision made by the mediator in terms of the Trade Disputes Act (2004) section (5) (a) (i) and (ii) 
shall be final. A party to the dispute may appeal to the Industrial Court in respect of decisions made 
pursuant to sub-sections (5) (a) (iii), (b) and (e).Any information divulged during the mediation process 
shall be confidential unless the party divulging the information states otherwise. A mediator shall not 
be a compellable witness in any legal proceedings in respect of anything said or information divulged 
during the mediation process relating to the dispute being mediated. A mediator shall issue a certifi-
cate of failure to settle if the dispute is not settled within the time period contemplated in sub-section 
(1) and (2) but if there are no prospects of settlement at a certain stage of the dispute a mediator may 
issue a failure to settle certificate before the expiry of 30 days as contemplated by subsections (1) and 
(2). 
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3.5 The Process of Arbitration 
The Commissioner shall refer a trade dispute referred in terms of section 7 to arbitration if the parties 
to the dispute agree to have the dispute settled by arbitration. If the parties to the dispute are engaged 
in essential services and the dispute concerns a dispute of interest or if the Industrial Court has in-
structed the Commissioner to refer the dispute to arbitration. The Commissioner after discussion with 
the parties to the dispute assigns an arbitrator from the panel of arbitrators to arbitrate the dispute, 
determine the venue, date and the time of the arbitration hearing. Regardless of whether the dispute 
has been mediated, if the arbitrator is of the view that there are prospects for settlement, mediation of 
the dispute may commence before the arbitration hearing. An arbitrator may deal with the dispute in 
whichever manner he considers appropriate but must make sure that the substantial merits of the dis-
pute are dealt with the minimum of legal formalities (Trade Disputes Act, 2004). 
The arbitrator is also given 30 days in which to attempt to settle the dispute. Subject to the discretion 
of the arbitrator as to the appropriate form of proceedings, a party to the dispute may give evidence, 
call a witness, question the evidence of any other party and address concluding arguments. Sections 
9 (8) states that the arbitrator shall have the power to: 
a) give such directions  or do such things as may be necessary or expedient for the expeditious 
and just hearing  and determination of any dispute before him 
b)  make an award for a specific period of time, or such other award he considers appropriate; or 
c) vary or rescind  the award if – 
 it was erroneously made in the absence of any party affected by the award  
 it is ambitious or contains an error or omission, but only to the extent of that ambiguity 
or error or omission, or 
 it was made as a result of a mistake common to the parties to the proceedings  
Upon conclusion of an arbitration hearing, the arbitrator shall make an award and shall within 30 days 
of the hearing, give reasons for the award (Trade Disputes Act, 2004). 
3.5 The Industrial Court 
The Industrial court was established as a court of law and equity, with all the powers and rights set 
out in the Trade Disputes Act or any other written law. The functions of this court include settling trade 
disputes and further, securing and maintaining good industrial relations in Botswana. The court may 
consist of one or more divisions each headed by an Industrial Court judge. When it comes to the ap-
pointment of judges the President of Botswana in accordance with the Section 96(3) of the Constitu-
tion shall appoint Industrial Court judges from among persons who are in possession of qualifications 
to be judges of the High Court. In appointing the judges the President shall, designate one of them as 
President of the Industrial Court with other judges ranking according to their dates of appointment 
(Trade Disputes Act, 2004). 
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 An Industrial Court judge shall vacate office after attaining the age of 70 years but the President of 
Botswana has the power to let a judge perform their duties beyond the retirement age of 70 for such a 
period as may be necessary to enable the judge to deliver judgment. Judges can only be removed 
from office for inability to perform the functions of their office, whether arising from infirmity of body or 
mind or from any other cause or if the judge has committed a serious misconduct. Other than judges 
there are two nominated court assessors who sit with the judges during court hearings. One of the 
two nominated members shall be selected by the Judge from among persons nominated by the or-
ganisation representing employees or trade unions in Botswana while the other one shall be selected 
from among persons nominated from the organisation representing employers in Botswana (Trade 
Disputes Act, 2004). 
Section 18(1) of Trade Disputes Act (2004) states that the Industrial Court or any other division of the 
court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in every matter properly before it under this Act and such juris-
diction shall include the power to: 
a) To hear  and determine all trade disputes  except disputes of  interest 
b) To interdict any unlawful industrial action 
c) To hear appeals and reviews from decisions of mediators and arbitrators 
d)  To direct the Commissioner of Labour to assign a mediator  to mediate a dispute, where in 
the opinion of the court, the matter has not been properly mediated or requires further  media-
tion  
e) To direct the commissioner to refer a dispute that is before the Court, to arbitration 
f) To refer any matter to an expert, and  at the court‟s  discretion, to accept the  expert‟s report 
as evidence  in the proceedings ; and  
g) Generally to give such directions and do such things as may be necessary or expedient for 
the expeditious and just hearing and determination of any dispute before it. 
The presiding judge shall decide any matter of law arising for decision at a sitting of the court and any 
question as to whether a matter for decision is a matter of law or a matter of fact but despite this the 
decision of the majority of persons representing the court shall be the decision of the court but if there 
is no majority the decision of the judge shall prevail. There shall be an appeal to the Court of Appeal 
against decisions of the industrial court (Trade Disputes Act, 2004). 
 
3.6 Physical distribution of offices 
The Dispute Resolution Unit which is responsible for both mediation and arbitration is located at the 
headquarters of the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. The unit is headed by a Principal Industrial 
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Relations Officer (PIRO 1).Mediation is conducted in District Labour Offices around the country. The-
se offices which are about 25 in total are located in cities, towns and big villages in every district in the 
country. Part-time mediation which is more common in Gaborone is also done in the District Labour 
Offices. Full-time arbitration is conducted by the Commissioner of Labour and other members of sen-
ior management in the Department of Labour and Social Security. Part-time arbitration takes place in 
Regional District Offices throughout the country except in Gaborone where it takes place at Gaborone 
District Labour office situated in Block 8, Gaborone. It is important to note that this office is the only 
one which is concerned only with dispute resolution, other district labour offices and regional labour 
offices deal with other labour issues like inspection, permits and compensation. The Industrial Court 
of Botswana is located in Gaborone and from time to time the judges of the court go to Maun in the 
Northern part of the country and Francistown in the north-east of the country to hold mobile courts 
there ( DLSS,2006). 
4. REVIEW OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM 
4.1 Presentation of findings from interviews (Interview guide attached as Appendix 1) 
4.1.1 The current performance of the system 
Most respondents seem to agree that the system is not doing too well; it is average according to most 
of the respondents. The system that is in place is working but it could be improved to work more ef-
fectively. To improve the current system most respondents believe that more mediators and arbitra-
tors should be employed, public awareness of the system and labour legislation should be improved 
and that there should be   thorough training of mediators and arbitrators. Respondents who are medi-
ators believe that if they could be given powers to take punitive actions when parties employers ap-
pear not to take them seriously (as often happens especially with employers) and this would make the 
system to work better. 
4.1.2 Delays in the system 
According to the respondents there are several reasons which contribute to the delays in the effective 
and efficient resolution of disputes. The most common is lack of manpower in the system as media-
tors and arbitrators are overwhelmed by the number of disputes. The other reasons which were raised 
by mediators who responded to the questions in the interview were that employers extend the time it 
takes for the mediation hearing because they usually come unprepared, without relevant documents 
which may assist in the case and sometimes the employer representatives do not have the mandate 
to make decisions for example whether or not to pay an employee during mediation. This forces the 
mediators to reschedule a case so that the employer can bring the relevant documentation or given 
powers to make decision in mediation. Other employers refuse to come for mediation: then when the 
mediator proceeds with a default award, they appeal and another hearing has to be scheduled. In or-
der to solve these problems that cause delays most respondents agreed that the best move forward 
would be to employ more arbitrators and mediators. Further, the mediators believe that, they should 
be given powers to penalise employers who deliberately delay the mediation process. 
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4.1.3 The Role of Government, Trade Unions and Employers 
All the respondents agreed that for the dispute resolution system to be effective government, trade 
unions and employers should work together. The government has the role of providing the institutions, 
resources for the system as well as carrying out public education to sensitise people about the sys-
tem. Employers on the other hand are charged with the responsibility of helping government by edu-
cating their employees about the system. Trade unions are also expected to educate their members 
so that they understand how the system works. 
4.1.4 Ways to improve the internal dispute resolution system 
A number of cases which could have been resolved at company level (internal dispute resolution) 
have been allowed to go to the external dispute resolution (mediation, arbitration and Industrial 
Court).When asked about factors which may improve the effectiveness of the dispute resolution sys-
tem most respondents believed that the management of labour relations should be improved in most 
companies in Botswana. Labour relations are still a new field in Botswana so most of the companies 
have Human Resource practitioners who may not have any or little appreciation for labour relations. 
Another factor which is important is that employers should open communication channels with their 
employees because usually disputes arise because employers do not speak with their employees. 
Employers should also educate their employees during orientation on general information about their 
employment. For example, how many leave days they are entitled, how to claim severance benefits, 
which public holidays are paid and which are unpaid. Ideally there should be a staff handbook which 
clarifies all this and every employee should own a copy or at the minimum have access to a copy. 
4.1.5 Independence of the dispute resolution system  
Almost all respondents agreed that the labour, resolution system in Botswana should be independent 
or have some form of autonomy from government. A number reasons were put forward for this sug-
gestion. Firstly, ever since the law was changed to include public sector workers in the definition of an 
employee they are entitled to use the system. This may pose a hierarchy challenge when for example 
a permanent secretary of a ministry represents that particular ministry (as the employer) in a media-
tion hearing which is chaired by a mediator who in the government hierarchy is a junior. The perma-
nent secretary may apply undue pressure on the mediator and this may erode impartiality (and thus 
legitimacy) which is one of the pillars of the mediation process. The second reason suggested by re-
spondents is that Ministry of Labour and Home affairs is too big and has so many departments that 
when it comes to the allocation of funds all these departments compete for whatever funds the minis-
try has been given and  there is not always enough for the Department of Labour and Social Security.. 
4.1.6 The role and qualifications of a mediator 
All the respondents agreed that the role of a mediator included bringing the parties together and me-
diating their dispute and further educating and advising them on the way forward regarding the dis-
pute they have reported. As far as qualifications of a mediator were concerned almost all except for 
two respondents agreed that a person who has a degree preferably in Labour Relations or Human 
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Resource Management is qualified to become a mediator. Others added that a legal background or 
specific training in mediation can help. There were two respondents who believed that having a de-
gree is not really important, a diploma or even somebody who has not had tertiary education can be a 
good mediator. Other respondents were of the view that personal qualities like   good people man-
agement skills, good negotiation skills, objectivity and being a good listener can be very helpful when 
one is a mediator. 
4.1.7 Legal representation during mediation 
Most respondents were in favour of the current system where legal representation is only allowed in 
arbitration and the Industrial Court. The reason why lawyers should not be allowed in mediation ac-
cording to most respondents is that they are too technical and this can lead to many ordinary workers 
not using the system as they would fear that they would come up against lawyers. Even in other coun-
tries legal representation is not allowed in mediation as it should be as informal as possible. 
4.1.8 Routing of disputes after mediation 
Many respondents felt that there is nothing wrong with the current system whereby when a dispute 
does not get resolved in mediation; parties can either choose to take it to arbitration or the Industrial 
Court. However two respondents suggested that maybe  the system should be changed to ensure 
that when a dispute is registered the  route it should go if it is not resolved at mediation, is prescribed 
Secondly, there was an issue of the Industrial Court having a high volume of cases and in order to 
improve the speed of resolution most respondents called for the employment of more judges. Others 
proposed that the Industrial Court have another branch in the northern part of the country, while some 
were more in favour of a comprehensive case management system in the Industrial Court. Those re-
spondents who are mediators proposed that if mediators were given more powers minor disputes like 
those which involve wages, leave, severance benefits and overtime could be resolved in mediation. 
There were those respondents who felt that by giving more powers to mediators they would no longer 
be performing the mediation function, but rather they would be taking binding decision akin to arbitra-
tion. 
 Thirdly, there was a question asked that if more cases were routed to arbitration (rather than adjudi-
cation) what changes would need to be made? Most interviewees responded by suggesting that more  
full-time arbitrators should be employed because currently there are a few part-time arbitrators em-
ployed and this has led to a backlog of cases in arbitration. Mr Leero who is currently a part-time arbi-
trator suggested that the pay rates for arbitration could be raised in order to make arbitration more 
attractive to experienced labour relations practitioners. 
4.1.9 Lessons which can be learnt from other dispute resolution systems  
There was a general agreement among respondents that in order to improve the Botswana dispute 
resolution systems benchmarking exercises should be carried out against countries with better dis-
pute resolution systems. Countries that were suggested were South Africa, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, Swa-
ziland, United Kingdom and Australia. Lessons which could be learnt included: the independence of 
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the system by benchmarking against South Africa‟s CCMA model, introduction of mixed processes 
like med-arbitration found in South Africa and Lesotho, how mediators and arbitrators could be ranked 
and remunerated fairly and even the case management which is practiced in Swaziland and South 
Africa. 
4.1.10 Additional words 
After the interview the researcher gave the respondents a chance just to comment generally about the 
study and labour dispute resolution in the country. While some declined to comment others were 
thankful that they were given an opportunity to take part in the study. There were others who were 
happy that the researcher has decided to research in this field because if more research and training 
could be done it could help to shape policy. 
4.2 Some information from the statistics  
4.2.1 The Frequency and incidence of dispute referral 
The statistics kept at the Department of Labour and Social Security (DLSS) show an increase of dis-
putes which are referred to District Labour Offices around the country. In 2009 there were 12241 cas-
es referred and a year later they increased by 1728 to 13969 (DLSS, 2011). 
 
Figure 2: The number of referrals to DLSS 2009 and 2010 (DLSS, 2011)   
Referrals to the DLSS vary from month to month, there are months in a year which receive less refer-
rals than others. Figure 2 below show variation of referral by month for 2009 and 2010. 
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Figure 3: The number of referrals by month for 2009 and 2010 (DLSS, 2011)  
 
4.2.2 The route of referred cases and processes 
a) Public information and Awareness 
The DLSS through its Inspection unit visits malls to disseminate public information about what the 
department does and how to register a trade dispute with the department. This practice has been 
popular in major urban areas like Gaborone, Francistown and Selibe-Phikwe. In 2009 a national call 
centre was launched in the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs, although the questions being asked 
in the call centre were not specifically about labour issues, it still helped a lot of people who had en-
quiries about dispute resolution. In all the District Labour Offices there are landline phones and people 
can phone the offices and ask about how the dispute resolution system works (DLSS office infor-
mation, 2011). 
b) Condonation 
In cases of unfair dismissal when a dismissed employee lodges a case outside the statutory 30-day 
period for date of dismissal, the employee concerned should apply for condonation/ of late referral. 
Condonation is only granted if the party asking for it provides valid reasons why they should be given 
it. There are no records for the number of condonations in the DLSS. 
c) Attendance at Mediation and Default Awards 
There have been a number of non-attendances at processes and this is a concern that has been not-
ed for a number of years now. A default award is reversible if the responding party presents valid rea-
sons why they did not attend the hearing in the first place. There are several reasons  attributed to  
non –attendance of cases, one of the main reasons is  poor notification of the  respondent  which can 
be blamed on the applicant because contact details are  taken from the  application form which  has 
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been completed by  the applicant. Another reason may be by the respondents‟ regard and a tendency 
to take advantage of the system.  
d) Categories of referral 
The number of unfair dismissal cases rose in 2010 while those of failure to pay wages, notice, leave 
and others were constant in the years 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
Figure 4: Categories of Referrals for 2009 and 2010 (DLSS, 2011)  
4.2.4 Outcome of disputes 
After mediation a case is either settled or referred to the Industrial Court or to arbitration. In the year 
2010 6518 cases were settled, 186 went to arbitration while 3724 went to the Industrial Court and 
2849 were withdrawn compared to 2009 when 6542 were settled, 2235 went to Industrial court, 585 
went to arbitration and 322 were withdrawn. 
 
36 
 
 
 
Figure 5: The number of cases settled at mediation, the number routed to Industrial Court or 
Arbitration and the number withdrawn for 2009 and 2010 (DLSS, 2011)  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
It was in the early 1980s when comprehensive labour legislation was promulgated in Botswana and 
the dispute resolution system put in place. Labour officers had the powers to charge employers if after 
their investigations they concluded that the indeed the employer had unfairly dismissed an employee. 
These powers were however curtailed after the 1992 reforms which saw the major Acts being 
amended. In line with labour trends at that time the Industrial Court was established to assist govern-
ment in the settlement of labour disputes. After the ratification of several ILO conventions in 1997 and 
the subsequent amendment of the major Acts in 2003/2004 the dispute resolution system was further 
improved when the Minister of Labour and Home Affairs was empowered to appoint a panel of media-
tors and arbitrators who possessed degree qualifications (unlike labour officers who did not need a 
tertiary qualification) to become mediators. In terms of the coverage of  types of  employee prior to the 
2003/2004  amendments  only private sector workers were covered, public sector employees were 
only covered after the 2003/2004 amendments when  they were now  included in the definition of  an 
„employee‟. Individual and collective disputes were covered by Botswana labour dispute resolution 
since the promulgation of the 1982/1983 Acts. Disputes of interest and rights dispute are routed to 
mediation and arbitration. However, only disputes of rights are entertained by the Industrial Court. A 
dispute is only referred to Industrial Court if it is a rights dispute and it remains unresolved after medi-
ation. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to narrate the evolution of the South African labour dispute resolution 
system, describe the current labour dispute resolution framework and lastly to review the performance 
of the system. 
2. EVOLUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICA LABOUR DISPUTE RESOLUTION SYSTEM 
 
The evolution of the South Africa labour dispute resolution can be divided into three eras. The first era 
is between 1920 and 1948 and covers the 1920 formation of Public Service Association (PSA) for 
white workers in the public sector and the Public Sector Act and the passing of Industrial Conciliation 
Act No. 11 of 1924 for the private sector. The second era covers the 1948 change brought by the Na-
tional Party government which included the Public Service Joint Advisory Council in the Public sector 
and in the Private sector there was the Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956 for white workers as 
well as the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act No. 48 of 1953 for Africans. The third era came in 
the late 1970s after the Wiehahn Commission recommendations which resulted in the collapse of the 
racially dual labour system so that all Private sector employees were  covered by the same labour 
legislation. As for the Public sector the changes that happened in 1979 did not affect them and it was 
only in 1993 that the Public Service Labour Relations Act was introduced.  
2.1 Dispute Settlement between 1920 and 1948 
After years of an inadequate statutory labour legislative framework, the 1922 Rand Revolt was the 
deciding factor that indicated to the South African government that it was time that a comprehensive 
piece of labour legislation was urgently needed. The revolt by white mineworkers was sparked by 
white workers protesting against a move by the mine owners to lay-off ten percent of the white work-
force. The white workers protested because they feared that African workers were going to replace 
them. When the strike ended after 70 days, over 200 people were dead and around 534 were serious-
ly injured (Venter, Levy, Conradie & Holtzhausen, 2009). 
This proved to  be a critical point in the South Africa„s pattern of labour relations because as a result 
of this the government of South Africa promulgated the Industrial Conciliation Act No.11 of 1924  
which introduced  dispute settlement system for the first time in the  South African labour  history. 
From the very beginning this machinery was based on the notion of voluntarism. That is the state 
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should only provide the framework for the settlement of disputes and the parties to the labour rela-
tionship would not be forced but encouraged to use the officially established machinery (Bendix, 
2010). 
 
2.1.1 Private Sector (White workers) 
This category of employees benefited immensely from the Industrial Conciliation Act 1924 because it 
called for the establishment of Industrial Councils for collective bargaining and to settle disputes be-
tween parties. These councils were envisioned to be self-governing within the framework provided by 
the government. They were registered when the Minister of Labour consider parties to sufficiently rep-
resentative of the employers and employees in a certain industry. Non-compliance to Industrial Coun-
cil agreements which had been made binding constituted a criminal offence. In the case where there 
was no  Industrial Council  the Act provided  for the creation of an ad hoc  conciliation  board  for both  
bargaining and  dispute settlement between trade unions (employees) or employers „ organisations 
(employers).Conciliation board agreements  were also legally binding and carried the same penalties 
for non-compliance  as Industrial Council agreements. In this Act the emphasis was more on collec-
tive-interest disputes and individual-right disputes were not dealt with by this Act which meant that 
they were covered in the normal civil courts. This Act further limited the right to strike as strikes and 
lock-outs were illegal during the currency of any agreement between the two parties (employees and 
employers) that forbad such action. (Du Toit, Woolfrey, Murphy, Godfrey, Bosch, Christie, 2006). 
Although Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards primarily   performed conciliation, they could al-
so perform arbitration to a limited extent. According to the Industrial Conciliation Act 1924 section 7 
provided for a majority of employer representatives and majority of employee representatives in an 
Industrial Council or Conciliation Board to agree to the appointment of an arbitrator to arbitrate a dis-
pute of right. Compulsory arbitration of both disputes of right and interest was only used in essential 
services where strikes were prohibited. Arbitration in non-essential services remained voluntary hence 
many disputes of right were referred to the civil courts for adjudication on the basis of law of contract 
(Majinda, 2007). 
2.1.2 Private Sector (Black workers) 
The Industrial Conciliation Act provided freedom of association rights in the form of registration of em-
ployers‟ organisation and trade unions to all employees except pass-bearing African workers. This 
basically meant that African males were excluded because African women, Indians and Coloureds 
were not required to carry passes (Du Toit, et al., 2006).The Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act 
No.36 of 1937 provided for the extension of Industrial Council agreements to cover African employees 
even though they were still not allowed to be represented in Industrial Councils and Conciliation 
Boards. This Act also allowed indirect representation of African employees‟ interests in the Industrial 
Councils by officials of the Department of Labour (Majinda, 2007). 
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2.1.3 Public Sector workers 
The Public Service Commission (PSC) administered all aspects of the employment relationship in the 
Public sector from 1912. In 1920 the Public Servants Association was established for white public 
servants after the Public Service Act of 1920 provided for the recognition of staff associations. 
Recognition was dependant on majority representation of the permanent employees in the various 
divisions of the public service (Adler, 2000). 
2.2 Dispute Settlement between 1948 and 1979 
In 1948 the National Party came to power largely because conservative white farmers, workers and 
employers feared the perceived growth in the power of African labour and the emergence of social-
ism. The new government crafted labour legislations to support the ideology of apartheid and ap-
pointed the Botha Commission to investigate the existing labour legislation. A result of Botha„s inves-
tigations the Native Labour Settlement of Disputes Act No. 48 1953 was promulgated to prevent and 
settle disputes affecting native employees. Subsequently, came the Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 
of 1956 which repealed the Industrial Conciliation Act No.36 of 1937 for white workers. As for public 
workers the Public Service Joint Advisory Council was established in the 1960s (Nel, Swanepoel, 
Kirsten, Erasmus &Tsabadi, 2005) 
2.2.1 Private Sector (White, Coloureds and Indians) 
 Recommendations by the Botha Commission to establish a coordinating body were ignored and the 
framework of the 1924 legislation remain largely intact. Some of the changes brought by the Industrial 
Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956 Act were to further entrench racial divisions by bringing in tighter con-
trols on the registration of mixed trade unions and the introduction of statutory job reservation. As far 
as dispute resolution was concerned  the Minister could appoint  a permanent Industrial  Tribunal  
with the powers to hear appeals  against decisions  of the registrar, undertake arbitration voluntarily 
requested by the parties to Industrial Councils or Conciliation Boards  as well as  compulsory  arbitra-
tions for essential services (Du Toit,et al.,2006). 
2.2.2 Private (African workers) 
In their bid to bring labour legislation in line with their apartheid policy the National Party government 
passed the Native Laws Amendment Act 54 of 1952 to control African women, who had “escaped” 
exclusion from the definition of employee in the Industrial Conciliation Act. The loophole which had 
allowed African women the status of employees was thereby closed (Du Toit, et al., 2006).The Black 
Labour Relations Regulation Act No.48 of 1953 applied to all blacks (also known as Bantu) who were 
employed in every trade except  those domestic workers in private households, those employed in 
farming operations and those who were working for government (Nel, et al., 2005). According to this 
statute if a Native labour officer believe that a dispute in the area in which he was appointed existed, 
he had to report that particular dispute to the regional committee concerned and to the inspector de-
fined by the regulation. The Native labour officer with the assistance of the regional committee and in 
collaboration with the said inspector, had to attempt to effect a settlement of the labour dispute failing 
which the matter could then be referred to the Central Native Labour Board which in collaboration with 
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such officer and such inspector had to endeavour to effect a settlement to the dispute (Schaeffer, 
1957). 
The government reacted speedily to the 1973 strike wave. In the same year it passed the Black La-
bour Relations Regulation Amendment Act No.70 of 1973 which provided for the creation of liaison 
committees at plant level as alternatives to the already existing workers‟ committees. These liaison 
committees were supposed to be representative of both employers and employees. The idea behind 
these committees was to improve communications between black employees and employers. This 
Act gave the black employees limited freedom to strike because under this Act a dispute resolution 
system similar to the one in the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 existed. The process was that dis-
putes arising from employers and black employees were first channelled to the Black Labour officer 
responsible for that area, after that it went to the regional Labour Committee, from there to the Divi-
sional Inspector and then the Black Labour Board. Only after all these channels were exhausted could 
workers engage in legal industrial action (Bendix, 2010). 
In 1977, the government made a last attempt to promote the committee system as alternative to un-
ionism by promulgating the Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act No.84 of 1977.This 
Act made it possible for more blacks to occupy jobs which were previously filled only by whites. Con-
trary to the desires of this Act, black trade unionism continued to grow and it appeared as if this Act 
did not achieve its intended purpose (Nel, et al., 2005). 
2.2.3 Public Sector Workers 
The Nationalist government established a Joint Public Service Advisory Council for white public sector 
workers the in the late 1960s. This structure was representative of all categories of white public serv-
ants and its primary role was to advise the Minister of Public Service on human resource matters. The 
Associations were allowed to make written submissions to this council.  
2.3 Dispute settlement in South Africa between 1979 and 1994 
The early 1970s was a period of many strikes carried out by black workers especially in the Durban 
area. This together with Soweto uprisings of 1976 and the flight of capital prompted the apartheid re-
gime in South Africa to appoint the Wiehahn Commission which was tasked to investigate labour leg-
islation as it pertained to African black workers (Nel,et al.,2005). 
 It must be noted that before 1979 the dispute resolution in South Africa was marred by problems. The 
statutory procedures were considered to be ineffective, lengthy and full of technicalities and instead of 
reducing disputes they created additional disputes leading to an increase in industrial action. Accord-
ing to a research carried out at that time the South African system of the adjudication of unfair dismis-
sals was among one of the lengthiest and most expensive in the  world and did not deliver  meaning-
ful results (Smith, 2008). 
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2.3.1 Private Sector employees 
Following the recommendations of the Wiehahn commission important changes were made, chief 
among these recommendation was that African workers should be included in the definition of what 
constituted an employee. This meant that now for the first time in the South African labour history 
black workers were extended freedom of association rights (Venter, et al., 2009). 
 The introduction of the Industrial Court provided a viable option to industrial action because before 
1979 if a dispute was not resolved the parties either engaged in industrial action or let the matter rest. 
It is true that they may have elected to go the arbitration route but although the arbitrator might have 
imposed settlement, his findings or even the findings of an Industrial Tribunal (which was replaced by 
Industrial Court) had little impact on the general behaviour of the parties concerned. Now after 1979, 
the wide definition of unfair labour practice provided a channel in which parties could refer all disputes 
which might otherwise have ended up in a strike to the Industrial Court using the unfair labour practice 
provision (Bendix, 2010). The Industrial Court  can be described as having been more  primarily suit-
ed to  resolve interest disputes  which were  referred to Industrial Councils  or Conciliation Boards  for 
conciliation and in the event they were not resolved  employees could strike and employers could 
lock-out employees. As for right disputes they were referred to ordinary courts to be decided on the 
basis of the law of contract (Smith, 2008). 
After  the statutory  collective bargaining and dispute resolution were opened to them  in 1979 black 
unions did not  jump into seeking to join Industrial Councils  or Conciliation Boards  as anticipated ,but  
they continued  to organise, seek recognition and bargain at non-statutory plant level  which they 
used under the committee system. By  doing this  black trade unions managed to  establish plant level 
collective bargaining and dispute resolution  to supplement  the Industrial Council  system of collective 
bargaining and dispute resolution (Majinda,2007).By accepting most of the Wiehahn Commission 
recommendations  the government was hoping  for a repeat  of  the success they had  of the 1924 Act 
by co-opting  and controlling  the militant new unions  but the new black trade unions were aware  of 
the danger of co-option  and initially avoided  registration. As pressure mounted they eventually regis-
tered, but they made a clever decision to reject Industrial Council participation in favour of bargaining 
at enterprise or plant level. This allowed them to maximise their power when bargaining and facilitated 
control of the unions by their members (Du Toit, et al., 2006). 
It must be noted that in the period after the Wiehahn Commission, the Industrial Conciliation Act was 
amended but the changes were minimal because workers still remained categorised and segregated. 
In 1981 the Act was changed and it was given a new name. The Labour Relations Amendment Act 
No.57 of 1981 and that is when it incorporated several important developments in South African la-
bour relations. Firstly it repealed all the exclusions which were left in 1979, then secondly it repealed 
the Black Labour Regulation Act and by so doing it meant that the Labour Relations Act was for all 
private sector employees regardless of race (Venter, et al., 2009). 
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2.3.2 Public Sector Workers 
 Calls for a formal bargaining mechanism by the PSA started in 1979 during the Wiehahn reforms but 
they were flatly rejected (Huluman, 2006).The historic 1979 reforms did not affected public servants. 
The Wiehahn Commission proposed that public servants be extended freedom of association rights 
but this was rejected by the government. In the beginning of the 1980s associations were formed 
along racial lines. The Institute for Public Servants (IPS) for African employees, Public Service Union 
(PSU) for Indian workers, and Public Service League (PSL) for coloured workers. These associations 
were allowed to make written submissions which were only recommendations to the Joint Advisory 
Council just like the PSA. These recommendations were not helpful because the state (employer) was 
not obliged to respond or even consider them when making decisions around conditions of service. 
After years of  consultations and pressure from employee organisations such as Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) through the International Labour Organisation (ILO) the government 
committed itself to collective bargaining  in the public sector  in 1988 (Huluman,2006). 
The beginning of the 1990s saw bitter struggles in the labour movement for the recognition of union 
organisations in the public service. There was a split in the public service during this period of indus-
trial action and labour unrest especially in health and education sectors. This resulted in the passing 
of two pieces of labour legislation in 1993 both dealing with public service labour relations, the Public 
Service Labour Relations Act (PSLRA) and the Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA).The PSLRA  
extended rights such as the right to strike and the right to organise to trade unions. It also established 
the Public Service Bargaining Chamber (PSBC) while the ELRA established a sector specific bargain-
ing council for educators; these bargaining councils were tasked with the prevention and resolution of 
disputes and the regulation of settlement of matters of mutual interest through negotiations (Smith, 
2008). 
3. DISPUTE RESOLUTION UNDER THE LABOUR RELATIONS ACT 66 OF 1995 
 
In 1994 a new non-racial, non-sexist and democratic South African regime under President Nelson 
Mandela was formed. In 1995 a new labour dispensation was introduced with the promulgation of the 
Labour Relations Act of 1995. This Act brought all employees in South Africa under a single piece of 
labour legislation whereas previously public sector employees were under administrative law. The 
Industrial Councils were replaced with Bargaining Councils that were responsible for collective bar-
gaining and, when accredited, for dispute resolution. The new LRA allowed for the formation of a new 
dispute resolution institution the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) 
tasked with resolving the majority of disputes that previously had been referred to the Industrial Court. 
The Labour Court which replaced the Industrial Court was thus relieved of much of the previous bur-
den placed on the court system (Bendix, 2010). 
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3.1 Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA)  
According to Nel et al (2005) the CCMA is a creation of Labour Relations Act 1995 in chapter 7.It is 
an independent body which has jurisdiction in all provinces of South Africa. The location of the com-
mission‟s head office is determined by the Minister of Labour in consultation with the governing body. 
Presently, the head office is in Johannesburg-and the commission must have an office in each prov-
ince and maintain as many local offices as deemed necessary. The main functions of the CCMA are: 
 Using conciliation to attempt to  resolve  any dispute properly referred to it in terms of the LRA 
 If the dispute is unresolved after conciliation, arbitrate it if the Act requires arbitration and any 
party requested that the dispute be resolved through arbitration. 
 Assisting  in the establishment of  workplace forums  
 Compiling and publication of information  and statistics about its activities 
3.1.1 Conciliation 
This is an alternative dispute resolution method in which parties to the dispute agree to the use of a 
conciliator. The conciliator will meet with the parties separately in order to resolve their differences. 
This role is to chair the meeting with the parties and help them to define their positions as well as 
summing up arguments. The conciliation process has no legal standing and the conciliator has no 
authority to make an award or to call witnesses. Conciliation is often confused with mediation yet the-
se two terms although usually used interchangeably do differ slightly. Mediation is defined as the ac-
tive intervention of a neutral third party who assists the parties to reach a mutually agreeable outcome 
through the facilitation of open and constructive dialogue (Venter, et al., 2009).  
According Nel et al (2000) section 135 of the LRA dictates that when a dispute is referred to the 
CCMA a commissioner should be appointed to attempt to resolve the dispute through conciliation. 
The commissioner shall do so within 30 days of the date the referral was received at the CCMA. The 
30-day period can be however be extended through the consent of the parties. In the proceedings of 
conciliation  a party to the dispute may appear in person or be  represented by a co-employee or a 
member, office bearer or official of that party‟s trade union or employer organisation. It is up to the 
commissioner to see how to proceed with the dispute. This may include mediating the dispute, con-
ducting a fact-finding exercise and making recommendations to the parties but at the end of the 30-
day period what is required from the commissioner is: 
 A certificate  must be issued indicating whether  or not a dispute  has been resolved  
 A copy of the certificate should be served  to each party  to the dispute  or his representative 
 The original of the  certificate  should be filed  with the CCMA 
The issuing of a certificate of resolution brings the matter to an end and neither party can pursue the 
settled dispute further, unless the conciliating commissioner acted irregularly and the certificate is set 
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aside on review by the Labour Court. A settlement agreement made at conciliation can be made into 
an order of court (Majinda, 2007). 
The CCMA must not disclose to anyone even to the court any information, knowledge or document 
which is acquired confidentially except only if it is an order of the court. The reasoning behind this 
confidentiality is that disclosure by the conciliator would seriously undermine the efficacy of the pro-
cess as well as the credibility of the CCMA (Du Toit, et al., 2006). 
The advantage of conciliation is that it extends the process of negotiation thus allowing the settlement 
of the dispute between parties without with interference of external agents. In the event that the pro-
cedure  dictates  that  conciliation be attempted  before industrial action  can be undertaken ,there is 
plenty of time allowed for parties to “cool off”  so that  they approach other in a friendlier  manner  and 
that they can seriously  attempt to settle  the matter before they could engage in an action that can 
seriously  destroy their relationship (Bendix,2010). 
3.1.2 Conciliation-Arbitration (Con-Arb) 
This process is the mixture of conciliation and arbitration. It usually starts with conciliation by a neutral 
third party and if this fails the person who was conciliating proceeds on to conduct arbitration, there-
fore the same person conducts both conciliation and arbitration. The process of Con-arb was intro-
duced in the 2002 amendments of LRA. Section 191(5A) dictates that an arbitration hearing should 
immediately follow conciliation proceedings once a certificate of non-resolution has been issued in 
disputes concerning dismissals or unfair labour practice relating to promotion. The Con-arb process 
may be used in other dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes that the CCMA is allowed to arbi-
trate but only if one of the parties does not object (Bosch, Molahlehi & Everett, 2004).Con-arb takes 
place as a continuous process in one day. Usually the same party acts as a conciliator then arbitrator, 
alternatively the roles of conciliator and arbitrator may be assumed by different third parties. The pur-
pose of this process is to save costs, reduce workload and the delays which occur when the two pro-
cesses of conciliation and arbitration are separated. The con-arb process is governed by rules of con-
ciliation in its conciliation aspect and rules of arbitration in the arbitration part (Majinda, 2007). 
3.1.3 Arbitration 
 According to Finnemore (2009) arbitration is when  there is direct intervention  by a third person  who 
plays a decisive role in  resolving  a dispute between  two parties  by conducting  a fair hearing, where 
arguments and evidence can be presented, and after the hearing the arbitrator  makes a final, binding 
decision. Venter et al (2009) make a distinction between two types of  arbitration; Compulsory arbi-
tration which  can take place either  in terms of a  collective agreement which stipulates arbitration as 
part  of the collective  bargaining process  or  in terms of  section 136 of the LRA which  says that ar-
bitration is compulsory where conciliation has failed  and parties are compelled to go for arbitration. 
Voluntary arbitration on the other hand is when parties are not compelled to go for arbitration after 
conciliation has failed, but if they agree amongst themselves the parties can still go for arbitration. So 
unless one of the parties objects such arbitration may be conducted by the same commissioner who 
was conducting conciliation (con-arb). 
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The two bodies which engage in the arbitration of disputes are the CCMA and Bargaining Councils. 
Bargaining councils and the CCMA (where there is no bargaining council) are allowed to arbitrate on 
disputes related to unfair dismissals and unfair labour practices as well as interest disputes in essen-
tial services. The Labour Court adjudicate on certain rights. Disputes which are referred to the Labour 
Court include those which arise from automatically unfair dismissals, victimisations, interpretation of 
agreements, and interference with the freedom of association, strike action and disagreements about 
organisational rights. The routing of disputes to the CCMA, Bargaining Councils or the Labour Court is 
clearly prescribed in the legislation (Bendix, 2010). 
The procedure of  arbitration as provided  by section 136  of the LRA stipulates that  where a dispute 
remains unresolved  after conciliation , and  a certificate  has been  issued, any party to the dispute 
may within 90 days  from the date when the certificate was issued  request that the dispute be re-
solved through arbitration. After this a commissioner should be appointed, which may be the same 
commissioner who attempted to resolve the dispute in conciliation.  
Venter (2003) identified several steps which are followed in the process of arbitration in South Africa, 
these include: 
 Preparation: when preparing for arbitration parties need to identify the issues in contention 
and collect evidence which will help them in the arbitration. As for witnesses they have to be 
additionally identified and prepared especially for examinations and re-examination purposes 
but this should not be confused with coaching the witness which should be avoided at all 
costs. Coaching a witness will include instructing a witness which evidence to lead and which 
response to give or not to give. 
 Introduction and House-keeping: each party to the proceedings should be introduced and the 
role of an arbitrator explained. It is this stage that the language requirements are established 
and if there is a need for an interpreter that the service must be provided. The layout of the 
room is also important; it is more adversarial and formal than mediation. The sitting arrange-
ment is that the arbitrator sits on one end of the table with parties flanking him or her on either 
side. Witnesses give testimony at the other end of the table. 
 Opening Addresses: parties  should be allowed  to state  their  respective  positions, first of all 
by introducing  themselves, summarizing the dispute  and the position taken  together with  
outlining  the case and the evidence  to be led. It is important that  during the opening  ad-
dress  parties should refrain  from creating expectations  which they cannot fulfill nor they 
should  they give  evidence  or admit  to anything. 
 Confirmation of Jurisdiction and narrowing of issues:  it is in this stage that the arbitrator 
should establish authority to preside on the proceedings. The other thing the arbitrator ought 
to do is to  is to determine  which facts  and disputes are not  in dispute  by going through 
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them, familiarising himself  with nature  of the dispute ,referring to any  law or legislation  
which might be applicable. 
 Examining Witnesses: when it comes to the process of examination, parties should make 
their witnesses feel comfortable by initially asking questions which allow the witness to estab-
lish their background. The examining party should make sure that the questions are clear 
enough so that it does not confuse and at the same time the examining party should not ask 
leading questions which suggest or prompt a response. 
 Cross-examination: the objective of cross-examination is to discredit the evidence presented 
by the other party. The opposing party should always be afforded the opportunity to cross ex-
amine. Cross-examination should not be used to bully the witness into submission but to win 
the witness over and gain his cooperation, while at the same time asking clever, probing 
question in order to test a witness‟s evidence against the facts. 
 Re-examination: during re-examination a party who first called the witness is allowed to re-
examine issues and clarify matters raised during cross-examination. What is worth noting in 
this stage is that new issues cannot be raised unless the arbitrator permits it. 
 Closing arguments: In closing the arguments parties should be clear, concise and logical and 
they should avoid being overly emotive. 
 Making the award: arbitration awards are final and binding. In South Africa, awards can be 
taken on review to the Labour Court. 
3.2 Bargaining Councils 
Under the new Act Industrial Councils have been renamed Bargaining Councils. The renaming of the 
councils showed that legislation applied beyond industry and private sector to include the public sec-
tor. Bargaining Councils may be established under the LRA. They are empowered to resolve disputes 
between its parties in terms of its constitution. A registered  trade union  and a registered employer 
organisation  may  establish  a Bargaining Council  for  a sector and area  by adopting  a constitution 
which fulfils the requirements of  Section 30  of the Act  and registering the Bargaining Council in 
terms  of Section 29 of the Act (Du Toit al.,2006;Nel,et al.,2005,Venter,et al.,2009). 
Du Toit et al (2006) identified the functions of Bargaining Councils to be: 
 Prevention of disputes by collective bargaining: a Bargaining Council provides a pre-emptive 
measure to promote industrial peace because one of its powers is to conclude and enforce 
collective agreements and to prevent and resolve labour disputes. 
 Settlement of disputes: another major function of bargaining councils which is provided by its 
constitution and by Section 51 is to resolve disputes. The council is empowered to  create and 
administer  funds  that are to be used  in the resolution of disputes, in this way  a council is 
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expected to  use the funds and  operate as  an accredited agency or to appoint  an accredited 
agency to perform the dispute settlement function 
 Residual function: these are functions which include the power to promote and establish train-
ing and education schemes as well as to administer and pension, provident, medical aid or 
similar schemes and funds. 
Section 36 establishes a overarching bargaining structure for the public sector called the Public Ser-
vice Co-ordinating  Bargaining  Council (PSCBC) which  acts as a Bargaining Council where coordi-
nation  is required  across sectors in the public sector or  if a sectoral  public  bargaining  council is 
non-existent. This body can also designate a sector of the public service for the establishment of a 
Bargaining Council which will deal with matters particular to that sector (Du Toit et, al., 
2006).According to Smith (2008) these sectoral councils include Public Health and Social Develop-
ment Sectoral Bargaining Council (PHSDSBC), Education Labour Relations Council (ELRC), Safety 
and Security Sectoral Bargaining Council (SSSBC) and General Public Service Sectoral Bargaining 
Council (GPSSBC).The PSCBC has been given accreditation by the CCMA to  perform both concilia-
tion and arbitration. Arbitration awards issued here are also final and binding and cannot be subjected 
to appeal although they can be reviewed. A fully fledged panel of conciliators and arbitrators has been 
appointed by the PSCBC to carry out dispute resolution functions. The PSCBC deals mostly with col-
lective disputes while the sectoral councils deal with individual disputes. 
3.3 The Labour Court and Labour Appeals Court 
The Labour Court was established by Section 51 as a superior court of law with the powers and sta-
tus in relation to matters under its jurisdiction, equal to those of a provincial division of the Supreme 
Court. This court is composed of the Judge President, his assistant and as many judges as the Presi-
dent, advised by National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), and also in consul-
tation with the Minister of Justice and the Judge President may deem necessary (Venter,et al., 2009). 
The Labour Court has the power to refuse a dispute if it is not satisfied that a prior attempt has been 
made to resolve it by conciliation, the only exception is those disputes which do not have to be first 
referred to conciliation such as applications for interdicts. The Labour Court according to section 145 
of the Labour Relations Act has the jurisdiction to review and set aside defective arbitration awards 
referred to it by any party to the dispute within six months and issued by commissioners of the CCMA. 
It also supervises arbitration proceedings of private arbitrators of other labour dispute resolution bod-
ies such as bargaining councils, statutory councils and accredited private agencies in terms of the 
Arbitration Act 42 of 1965 (Majinda, 2007). 
According to LRA (1995) the grounds on which an award may be reviewed include: 
 The commissioner  committed misconduct in relation  to his/her duties 
 Commissioner  committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of proceedings 
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 The commissioner exceeds his powers 
 The  award was  improperly obtained 
There have often been jurisdictional clashes between the Labour Court and the High Court over the 
years but it must be noted that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction in all matters that the La-
bour Relations Act or any another law that prescribes that it should be determined by the Labour 
Court. The High Court retains its jurisdiction of common law (Du Toit, et al.,2006) According Majinda 
(2007) the High Court does not have concurrent jurisdiction to handle  disputes which has been ex-
pressly assigned to the Labour Court but the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High 
Court in those matters which have not been particularly assigned to the Labour Court such as any 
alleged breach of any fundamental rights conferred by chapter 2 of the Constitution to which the La-
bour Relations Act does not give effect. 
According to Section 167 of the LRA the final court of appeal in respects of judgments made and or-
ders made at the Labour Court is the Labour Appeal Court (LAC) and just like the Supreme Court of 
Appeal it is a superior court and it enjoys the same status. The LAC consists of the judge president of 
the Labour Court who is also the president of the LAC, deputy judge president and three other judges 
from the High Court (Nel et al., 2005). 
Judgments issued at Labour Appeal Court are binding on the Labour Court and arbitrators even if the 
Labour Court or the arbitrator in question is of the view that the decision of the Labour Appeal Court is 
plainly wrong, except of course where the higher court had not referred to the rules that would neces-
sarily have led to a different conclusion. According to the Constitution an appeal against such deci-
sion, judgment or order of the Labour Appeal Court to the Supreme Court of Appeal exists. If a dis-
pute concerns a constitutional matter the final appeal destination is the Constitutional Court. In the 
Labour Appeal Court if two of the three judges constituting the LAC agree, the decision is final (Majin-
da, 2007). 
4 .PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
 
The South African labour law provides for parties to resolve their dispute through private processes 
otherwise commonly known as private dispute resolution. Private arbitration that is part of private dis-
pute resolution is conducted by an agreement between the parties in which they choose an arbitrator 
and this agreement also determines the terms of reference and powers. The Labour Relations Act 
expects private dispute resolutions agencies to play a major role in dispute resolution system. They 
may do this as agencies accredited by the CCMA or as private bodies (Smith, 2008). 
The Labour Relations Act of 1995 vests the powers to licensed private agencies to attempt to resolve 
disputes through conciliation and arbitration. As long as it is accredited by CCMA any organisation 
can perform dispute resolution functions under the Act. The CCMA may accredit any applicant to per-
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form any function for which it seeks accreditation for as long as the services provided meet the CCMA 
standards. Provided the applicant is able to conduct its activities effectively, the dispute resolvers are 
competent and independent, the applicant has a clear code of conduct to govern its dispute resolvers, 
reasonable disciplinary procedures are kept in place to make sure that dispute resolvers adhere to the 
code of conduct and lastly the applicant‟s service should be seen to be broadly representative of 
South Africa (Kwakwala, 2009). 
Tokiso Dispute Settlement (Pty) Ltd is South Africa‟s largest and most active private dispute resolu-
tion service in the labour field. Tokiso was established 10 years ago in a direct response to the clo-
sure of Independent Services of South Africa (IMMSSA).Ever since its inception Tokiso has grown to 
be the largest private dispute resolution provider in country with 255 panelists (mediators, facilitators 
and arbitrators) across all provinces and also in other countries who resolve over 10 000 disputes per 
annum (Tokiso Profile, 2011). 
5 .REVIEW OF THE PERFOMANCE OF THE SYSTEM 
5.1 The frequency and incidence of dispute referral 
The incidences of cases in all dispute resolution institutions in South Africa has increased for the peri-
od 2006 to 2011 as shown in the figure below, the recent economic recession seems to have in-
creased the number of disputes in the labour relations field and thereby increased the number of cas-
es being referred to dispute resolution institutions. The CCMA caseload increased by an additional 13 
291(9.5%) cases when compared to  the 2008/2009 financial year while  Bargaining Councils  also 
saw  the same significant increase in the case overload of  both statutory disputes and compliance 
cases(Tokiso,2011). 
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Figure 6: Referrals to CCMA and Bargaining Councils for 2007 to 2010 (Tokiso Digest, 2011) 
According to CCMA (2009/2010) a total number of 153 657 cases were referred to the CCMA. Twen-
ty-two percent of the cases referred were deemed to be non-jurisdictional and they were screened 
out. There was an 11% increase of jurisdictional cases over the previous year. Unfair dismissals rep-
resented the largest number of disputes accounting for 81% of the total case received. On the other 
hand the breakdown of referrals by sector has remained consistent. The retail sector has always ac-
counted for the highest number of referrals ever since the inception of the CCMA and in the 
2008/2009 it accounted for 15% of all referrals in this financial year. 
 
Figure 7: Referrals by Sector for 2008/2009 to 2009/2010 financial years  
 
5.2 The course of referred cases and processes 
 
5.2.1 Public Information and Awareness  
In June 2002 the CCMA national call centre was launched and it has had a huge impact on the 
CCMA. In 2009/2010 the call centre dealt with 172 481call and this was a 1% increase from the pre-
vious year. The call centre provided information‟s on case related queries and labour legislation which 
accounted for 48% and 42% respectively of all cases. 
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Table 3: Breakdown of Calls by Province 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 
Province  2009/2010 2008/2009 
Gauteng 62% 59% 
Western Province  16% 17% 
KwaZulu Natal 14% 15% 
Other 8% 9% 
 
The percentage breakdown of calls received by province was fairly consistent with the percentage 
breakdown of referrals by province. Gauteng accounted for 62%, Western Cape accounted for 16% 
and KwaZulu Natal accounted for 14%. The other provinces together accounted for 8 %( CCMA, 
2010). 
 
5.2.2 Condonation 
In cases of unfair dismissal when a dismissed employee lodges a case outside the statutory 30-day 
period for date of dismissal or in the cases of unfair labour practice when an employee lodges a case 
after 90 days, in both cases the employee concerned should apply for   condonation of late referral.  
Under the CCMA Rules the party applying for condonation must set out grounds for seeking condona-
tion and must include details of the following: 
 The degree of lateness 
 The reasons for lateness 
 The referring  party‟s prospects  of succeeding  with the referral and obtaining the relief 
sought  against the other party 
 Any prejudice  to the other  party; and 
 Any other relevant factors 
About 70% of the condonation applications are successful. The Tokiso Digest (2010) raises for dis-
cussion the issues that it appears that commissioners just grant condonation even if the reasons for 
lateness are not reasonable. According to them figure should be lower considering the fact that the 
onus falls on the applicant to show good cause (Tokiso, 2010). 
5.2.3 Scheduling of Cases 
 When a case comes to the CCMA it is usually screened first so that it is checked if it is under the 
CCMA‟s jurisdiction. If it is within the CCMA‟s jurisdiction it is scheduled for con-arb, unless   there is 
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an objection. In the event there is an objection the case has to be scheduled for conciliation and if it 
still remains unresolved the applicant is free to refer it to arbitration (Tokiso, 2010). 
5.2.4 The Con-Arb Process 
In this process the commissioner attempts to conciliate the dispute and if it does not get resolved the 
same commissioner issues a non-resolution certificate and continues to arbitrate the case. In 2009/10 
CCMA  of the total number of conciliations heard 67% were originally scheduled for the con-arb pro-
cess but only 45% were heard at con-arb process due to objections party has the right to object 
(Tokiso, 2010). 
5.2.5 Attendance at Arbitration and Default Awards 
The high-level of non-attendance at processes is a concern that has been noted for a number of 
years. According to the CCMA statistics 32% of awards  issued are default awards while Tokiso  rec-
ords a total of  non-attendance at 21%.There are several reasons  attributed to  non –attendance of 
cases, one of the main reasons is the  poor notification of the  employer which is hardly CCMA‟s fault 
because  contact details are  taken from the  application form which  has been completed by  the ap-
plicant (Tokiso, 2010) 
 
Figure 8: Non attendance at CCMA and Bargaining Council Arbitration and Con-Arb in 2008 
5.2.6 Representation and Assistance 
According to Tokiso (2010) over the past five years there have been patterns of representation in arbi-
tration where parties have been represented by an attorney, union or employer organisation. For 
about a third of arbitrations there has been representation by a third party for either one of the parties 
and those figures have consistent over this period. 
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5.3 Categories of referral 
According to the CCMA (2010) there is almost an identical pattern of the types of cases referred year 
to year. Dismissals remain the largest category of disputes and in the year 2009/2010 they accounted 
for 82% of all referrals to the CCMA 
 
 
Figure 9: Referrals by Issue 2008/2009 and 2009/2010 
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Figure 10: Types of Dismissal Arbitrated 2008, 2009 and 2010 
 
5.4 Outcome of disputes 
5.4.1 Settlement rate 
The CCMA statistics and Tokiso statistics differ sharply when it comes to the issue of settlement rate. 
For some time now Tokiso has queried the CCMA‟s claim that they post over 60% settlements each 
year. In 2009/10 the CCMA annual report reported a 67% settlement rate in all processes and 62% in 
conciliation. This is because there are differences in the way the CCMA and Tokiso define settlement. 
The CCMA does not publish its definitions, categorisation or the basis for which they calculate it fig-
ures. Below is the breakdown of the CCMA‟s settlement figure for 2009/10: 
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Table 4: CCMA’s breakdown of settlement’s figures 2009/2010 
Case withdrawn 10 827 
Settled by parties 1 558 
Settled in arbitration 9 602 
Settled in con-arb 18 926 
Settled  in conciliation 9 890 
Settled in in-limine hearings 1 730 
Settled in pre-conciliation contact 4 488 
Settled in pre-dismissal arbitration 11 
Settled in rescission hearings 76 
TOTAL SETTLEMENT 57 108 
 
The above table shows that 57 108 cases are settled and if the CCMA had 108 000 jurisdictional cas-
es then this means that 53% of these jurisdictional cases were settled across all processes. As for the 
settlement rate of conciliation it was 9 890 cases, translating to 31 %( Tokiso, 2010). 
5.4.2 The outcome of awards 
According the CCMA annual report  62% of awards were in  favour  of the employee party and 38% 
were in favour of the employer party, but the  Tokiso records  remain different from the CCMA‟s rec-
ords. Due to the high number of default awards issued by the CCMA figures are always going to be 
skewed because the majority of them favour the employee party (Tokiso 2009/10). 
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Figure 11: Outcome of CCMA and Bargaining Council Cases including and excluding Default 
Awards 
5.4.3 Breakdown for the reason for unfairness 
The reason for unfairness remained very consistent over the past three years. It is interesting to note 
that procedural unfairness has been consistent at around 4% for the last 2 years. When there is pro-
cedural unfairness in a dismissal case the reason is usually because there was no hearing at all 
(Tokiso 2010). 
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Figure 12: Outcomes of cases 
5.4.4 Remedies for unfair dismissal 
Over the past three years compensation has consistently been the remedy of choice for unfairness in 
the dismissal disputes. When comparing the preferred remedy for unfair dismissal from one year to 
another, it is interesting to note that a trend of an increase in compensation rather than reinstatement 
emerges (Tokiso, 2010). 
 
Figure 13: Remedies for Unfair dismissal 
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5.5 Strike Action 
2010 was the year with the greatest incidence of strike action in South Africa‟s labour history. 
 
Figure 14: Workdays (in millions) lost to strike action-1995 to 2010 
5.5.1 Number of workdays lost 
From the data above  the number of days  lost to strike rose  to 14.6 million in the period 1 January  to 
December 2010,compared with  2.9 million in the corresponding period  in  2009.This remains the 
highest  number of strike incidences recorded in the post-democracy  South Africa. The public sector 
strike in September which accounted for the loss of 12 million work days was the major contributor to 
this massive loss of work days. Other high profile strikes included municipal strike in April, Transnet 
strike in May, automobile and tyre sectors in August and the retail motor industry strike in September. 
5.5.2 Strike Triggers 
The major strike trigger was wages. Wages accounted for 77% of the number of strikes and 99.6% of 
working days lost. It was followed by recognition/bargaining levels which accounted for 0.3% of work-
days lost and 11.4% of strikes. Grievances came third with less than 1% of working days and 11.4% 
of the number: 
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Figure 15: Distribution by trigger-1995 to 2010 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The first comprehensive labour legislation was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 which introduced 
Industrial Councils and Conciliation Boards as dispute resolution instruments albeit for white workers 
in the private sector only since black (male) workers were excluded from the definition of an employ-
ee. As for public sector workers they were not included in the labour legislation as well. The nature of 
disputes covered was collective/interest disputes only while individual/rights disputes went to the ordi-
nary courts. The turning point for the South African dispute resolution was in 1979 with the Wiehahn 
commission recommendations which brought changes to the 1956 Industrial Conciliation Act. These 
changes included; the establishment of the Industrial Court (with full powers of equivalent that of a 
branch of the Supreme Court) which now covered unfair labour practice disputes and black workers 
were now included in the definition of an employee which means that they were now covered under 
the system. Public sector employees were still not covered in the system. It was only in the new la-
bour dispensation of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 brought about by the fall of apartheid that all 
employees whether public or private sector employees were covered under the same piece of labour 
law. Institutions of dispute resolution included the CCMA, Bargaining Councils and Labour Court. All 
disputes are covered under this current system, individual/rights dispute and interests/collective dis-
putes. The CCMA employs people with labour related tertiary qualifications and experience as com-
missioners. Private dispute resolution is being provided by Tokiso which is accredited by the CCMA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN BOTSWANA AND SOUTH AFRICAN DISPUTE    
RESOLUTION SYSTEMS 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter is responsible for finding differences and similarities between the two systems. This will 
be undertaken using the framework developed in Chapter 1.Firstly by looking at the elements which 
includes nature of disputes, coverage, processes, avenues of dispute resolution, human resources, 
and secondly, the two systems will be compared using the goals of the system legitimacy, efficiency, 
affordability, accessibility, informality and costs. 
2. COMPARISON OF THE SYSTEMS 
2.1 Elements of the systems 
 
2.1.1 Nature of disputes  
In the Botswana dispute resolution system both disputes of rights and dispute of interest can be 
referred to mediation but then if the dispute remains unresolved disputes of interest cannot go to 
Industrial Court they only go to arbitration while disputes of right can go to either arbitration or 
Industrial Court. Individual and collective disputes can be referred to mediation and if the dispute 
remains unresolved, a collective dispute it can only be referred to arbitration since the Industrial court 
does not have the jurisdiction to hear disputes of interest.  
 
In the South African dispute resolution  system  disputes of right are  referred to either a Bargaining 
Council or  CCMA for conciliation and when the dispute  remains un resolved it can either go to arbi-
tration or adjudication  in the Labour court. Disputes which go to the labour court include; unfair labour 
practices entailing discrimination, automatically unfair dismissals, dismissal relating to retrenchment. 
Dismissals relating to incapacity, incompetence or misconduct are the ones which go to arbitration. As 
for disputes of interest they are also referred to conciliation in either a bargaining council or CCMA. 
Only disputes of interest in essential services are referred to arbitration if they remain unresolved after 
conciliation. Other disputes of interest if they are not resolved at conciliation the next step is strike 
action or lockout (Bendix, 2010). 
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2.1.2 Coverage 
In Botswana both private and public employees are covered by the dispute resolution system. Previ-
ously public sector employees were not covered in the dispute resolution system but ever since the 
Trade Disputes Act was amended in 2003 the new definition of an „employee‟ includes civil servants. 
The only cadres not covered in the definition of an employee are the Botswana Defence Force, the 
Botswana Police Force and Directorate of Intelligence Services as is standard practice in most coun-
tries. 
In South Africa the promulgation of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 united the South Africa work-
force which was divided by the apartheid regime. For a very long time only private sector workers 
were covered by the dispute resolution mechanism. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 excluded 
male Africa workers. It was only after amendments of the 1956 Industrial Council Act in the wake of 
Wiehahn Commission recommendations that African workers were included in the dispute resolution 
system. Public sector employees took longer to have their own dispute resolution mechanism. It was 
only  in 1993 that the Public Service Labour relations Act (PSLRA) was  promulgated  together with 
Education Labour Relations Act (ELRA).These two pieces of labour legislation established Bargaining 
Councils which together with the Police‟s National  Negotiation  Forum (NNF),were responsible for  
the prevention and  resolution of disputes and the regulation  settlement of matters of mutual interests 
through negotiations. The new Labour Relations Act of 1995 covered all workers in South Africa un-
der a single piece of legislation. Those who are not covered are members of the South Africa Defence 
Force, National Intelligence Agency and the South African Secret Services (Smith, 2008).The differ-
ence here is that in Botswana the Police are excluded from the definition of the word „employee‟ while 
in South Africa they are included in the Labour Relations Act just like any other public sector employ-
ees. 
2.1.3 Avenues of dispute resolution 
In the Botswana system all types of labour disputes are referred to mediation provided by the Dispute 
Resolution Unit in the Department of Labour and Social Security. This includes disputes of right, dis-
putes of interest, collective and individual disputes. Collective disputes of interest are only referred to 
arbitration, the Industrial Court does not have jurisdiction in these matters. As for individual disputes 
of rights they either go to arbitration or Industrial Court depending on the choice of the parties. For a 
dispute to go to arbitration both parties should consent to that action by signing the arbitration referral 
form. If one of the parties does not agree with the other party‟s decision to refer the dispute to arbitra-
tion the party may reject and the dispute would be referred to Industrial Court. 
In South Africa all types of disputes come for conciliation to the CCMA or Bargaining Councils. If after 
conciliation these disputes remain unresolved the legislation prescribes the route. For example, free-
dom of association (freedom from victimisation) goes to Labour Court; disputes of interest in essential  
services  goes to arbitration; dismissals due to incapacity, incompetence or misconduct goes to arbi-
tration; automatically unfair  dismissals go to Labour Court, dismissals  relating to participating  in  
strike  for reasons  linked to closed shop go to Labour Court, dismissals  relating to  reason for re-
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trenchment go to Labour Court, unfair labour practices(excluding  discrimination) go to arbitration; 
unfair labour practices entailing  discrimination go to Labour Court and interest disputes  go to strike 
action unless if it is a dispute about refusal to  bargain (Bendix,2010). 
2.1.4 Human resources 
The people who are employed in the system as mediators and arbitrators should well be qualified 
people with an in-depth knowledge of the legal framework of the country.  
 
In Botswana the Trade Disputes Act of 2004 empowers the Minister to establish a panel of mediators 
and arbitrators with the Commissioner of Labour as the chair of this panel. The Minister may appoint 
to the panel, mediators and arbitrators with expertise in labour law or labour relations or other special-
ist areas of expertise. Mediators are either fulltime or part-time (Trade Dispute Act, 2003). Full-time 
mediators are government officials who are employed through the Directorate of Public Service Man-
agement, most of them hold degrees in human resource management, social sciences and labour 
relations. Part-time mediators are people with qualifications and experience in labour relations, most 
of them have their own labour relations consultancy companies while some hold key labour relations 
positions in the private sector. There are only six full-time arbitrators but they rarely arbitrate because 
of their workload which involves working as heads of other units in the department. They include the 
Commissioner and senior management staff in the Department of Labour and Social Security. They 
hold arbitration certificates from University of Namibia. Like part-mediators, part-time arbitrators are 
people with expertise in the labour relations field, these include; labour lawyers, human resource 
managers from companies in the private sector and labour consultants. 
 
In South Africa the governing body of CCMA is tasked by Section 117 of the Labour Relations Act 
with the appointment of Commissioners who are appointed on the strength of their experience and 
expertise in labour matters particularly in labour dispute resolution. Complete impartiality is expected 
from commissioners.Commisoners are employed on either full time basis or part-time basis. There are 
several categories of commissioners. Senior commissioners are those who manage other commis-
sioners and monitor the conciliation and arbitration hearings and they should have an equivalent of 
NQF 7 tertiary qualification preferably in labour law; Level A commissioners are employed to conduct 
conciliation, arbitrations and con-arbs and they should have at least 6 years in labour relations field 
and have an equivalent of NQF 6 qualification. Level B commissioners are also expected to conduct 
the processes of arbitration, conciliation and con-arb at the CCMA and they should have at least 4 
years in the field of labour relations and possess an NQF 5 qualification (CCMA, 2011). 
 
2.1.5 Processes 
a) Conciliation/Mediation 
 In Botswana the first process which aggrieved parties go to is mediation which includes facilitation, 
fact-finding and the making of an advisory award. Mediation in Botswana is similar to conciliation in 
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South Africa in the sense that in both processes a dispute has to mediated or conciliated within 30 
days from the day it was referred and the period can only be extended by agreement between the two 
parties to postpone. Mediation and conciliation are both private and confidential processes, any in-
formation divulged in the hearings shall be confidential and without prejudice and a mediator or com-
missioner cannot be a compellable witness in a court of law in respect of the information divulged in a 
hearing. The other point is that in both Botswana and South Africa legal representation is not allowed 
at this stage. The main difference between the Botswana and South Africa dispute resolution systems 
as far as conciliation/mediation is concerned is in South Africa there is a provision for conciliation-
arbitration as a single process in regard to dismissal and unfair labour practice disputes. This provi-
sion was introduced by the August 2002 Labour Relations Act amendments in an attempt to expedite 
the dispute resolution process by making  conciliation  and arbitration to take place in one continuous 
process in the same day (Majinda,2007). 
b) Arbitration 
 In Botswana arbitration is a private and confidential process and arbitrators cannot disclose to any 
person or in any court information acquired in the course of performing the function as arbitrators 
(Trade Disputes Act, 2003). 
In South Africa arbitration hearings are open public hearings. This is according to section 34 of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa which provides that  arbitration by the CCMA is a public  
hearing because the Commission itself is a public body that is subject to the Constitution which pro-
vides that  everyone has the constitutional  right to have  their  disputes resolved  by application of the 
law  decided in a  fair public hearing either before a court or  an impartial tribunal. Despite this it is not 
practical to have arbitration as a public hearing unless there is consent on both parties to the dispute. 
The arbitrator has the power to order out those who attend the arbitration hearing (Majinda, 
2007).According to the LRA (1995) circumstances where legal practitioner may be allowed in arbitra-
tion proceedings are: 
 Consent of the commissioner  and the other  parties 
 Where  the commissioner  concludes  that it is unreasonable  to expect  a party to deal  with 
dispute  without legal representation  after – 
 The  nature  of  the questions of law raised  by the dispute 
 The complexity of the dispute 
 The public  interest; and  
 The comparative  ability of opposing  parties to deal with  the dispute 
In Botswana an arbitrator is allowed to start with mediation or conciliation if he thinks that the dispute 
can be resolved by mediation, this happens if the parties consent to this action. In Botswana a legal 
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practitioner may be allowed in arbitration only a) if both parties agree to it b) at the request of a party 
to the dispute if the arbitrator is satisfied that the dispute is of such complexity that warrants the party 
to have a legal representative and that will not prejudice the other party. 
c) Labour Court/Industrial Court 
In Botswana the Industrial Court was established in 1992 after labour legislation reforms which were 
introduced in that year. The court enjoys powers which are equal to those of the High Court and the 
judges are appointed by the President of the country. The functions of this court include settling trade 
disputes and further, securing and maintaining good industrial relations in Botswana. The industrial 
court judge when presiding on a dispute sits with two court assessors one nominated by labour and 
the other one nominated by business. In South Africa there is no provision for court assessors but 
there are three judges who preside over a case in the Labour Courts. Furthermore in Botswana par-
ties appeal to High Court of Appeal there is no labour-specific appeals court like in South Africa where 
there is Labour Appeals Court (LAC). 
2.2 Performance of the system 
2.2.1 Efficiency 
The efficiency of the system is the most important goal. Disputes should be resolved as speedily as 
possible and there must be prompt response to all disputes. An effective dispute resolution system is 
the one which expeditiously resolves a high number of disputes in minimum of time. Systems which 
are slow and take a long time to produce a resolution are inefficient (Budd & Colvin, 2008).  
In Botswana there are several concerns about the efficiency of the dispute resolution system. Of the 
15 people interviewed in Botswana only one person thought the system was effective. Many respond-
ents pointed out factors such as shortage of manpower in the dispute resolution unit; lack of re-
sources like transport and office space; mediators and arbitrators lacking training; backlog of cases in 
the Industrial Court as  some of  those factors which impede the efficiency of the Botswana dispute 
resolution  system.  
In South Africa at the CCMA efficiency relates to the time taken in conciliation, con-arb or arbitration 
proceedings. The Labour Relations Act directs that conciliations should be concluded in 30 days of 
the referral of disputes, arbitrations should be done within 90 days. In order to enhance efficiency the 
CCMA has set an internal efficiency target of 60 days for arbitrations meaning that the CCMA has 
committed to conclude arbitrations in 60 days instead of the statutory 90 days set out for arbitration 
(Bhorat, Pauw & Mncube, 2007).Efficiency also relates to the settlement rate of dispute resolution, 
this means total disputes referred versus total disputes resolved. According to CCMA reports over the 
years there is an increase of the settlement rate from one year to another, this shows that the 
CCMA‟s efficiency has been increasing over the years (Kwakwala, 2009).Looking at the two dispute 
resolution systems one can conclude that the South Africa system is more efficient than the Botswana 
system. 
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2.2.2 Accessibility 
Accessibility of a labour dispute resolution system means the awareness and understanding of the 
system by employers, employees and the general public. This also relates to the dispute resolution 
office being within a reasonable travelling distance. The ability to access the system means that per-
sonal characteristics which include education levels, situational characteristics, such as the availability 
of service centres or the cost of legal services, do not prevent a party from using the dispute resolu-
tion system (Kwakwala, 2007). 
 
In Botswana there is a problem of the general public not understanding the system and not knowing 
where to find the services provided by the system. On many occasions people go to a member of par-
liament in a certain area to report a labour matter. This often delays the dispute and in terms of dis-
missal disputes the 30 days in which a dispute may be registered may expire. Others go to the Com-
missioner of Labour‟s office to report there thinking that since it is a higher office than District Labour 
offices this will work in their favour. Most people have shown a lack of understanding of how the la-
bour office operates. They think that mediators and arbitrators are government officials who are there 
to make sure that they are not ill-treated by employers. The travelling distance to a labour office in 
most rural areas is far and this discourages most people employed in rural areas. There are only 24 
District Labour offices in Botswana and most of them are in urban and peri-urban areas. On the posi-
tive side  in the Botswana dispute resolution system  when a person  approaches correct office  the 
system, there is a friendly  officer at the reception who  will direct the  aggrieved party to the registra-
tion office where they will be  asked to present their dispute  orally. Then if the registering  officer is  
satisfied that the labour office has jurisdiction in the matter then the aggrieved party will be given a 
form called „referral‟ form to  formally  lodge a complaint. If the aggrieved party cannot write the officer 
will write for them. This shows that anyone is able to refer a dispute to a trade dispute resolution cen-
tre. 
In South Africa the CCMA ensures accessibility of the commission to users by not having a compli-
cated referral procedure. This way illiteracy and lack of skill are not barriers to the system. When a 
complainant approaches the CCMA to register a dispute the only procedural requirements are to 
submit a form of conciliation and if the dispute goes to arbitration submit a form of arbitration. The 
CCMA can be said to be highly effective taking into consideration the high number of out-of-
jurisdiction cases. This can be presumed to mean that this excessive number of cases referred to 
CCMA is due to its ease of access (Kwakwala, 2009).Evaluating the two systems in respect to acces-
sibility the South Africa system is much more accessible than the Botswana system. 
2.2.3 Informality 
A dispute resolution system should be as informal as possible in order to attract many users. This 
means minimum emphasis on procedural formalities, minimum emphasis on legal formalities and that 
there should be an opportunity for party to represent themselves. Informality of the dispute resolution 
should emphasize that disputes are handled in an informal, non-legalistic way.  
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In Botswana the move to out-law legal representation at mediation was a deliberate move to make the 
system as informal as possible level. However for legal representation to be allowed in arbitration it is 
up to the arbitrator to allow it and in Industrial Court it is allowed. A person who is not educated can 
approach the District Labour office where a receptionist will direct them to a registration office. In the 
registration office the complainant will make their presentation orally and after the registering officer is 
satisfied that the labour office has jurisdiction on the dispute the complainant will be given a referral 
form to fill and if they are cannot write the officer will write for them. Then after that they will be given 
the other party‟s referral form so that they can notify them of the date of mediation. In a series of in-
terviews conducted among labour relations experts in Botswana, most of the respondents indicated 
that legal representation in mediation is not necessary as legal representatives do not care about the 
settlement all they want to do is to win the case for their clients. They point out that mediation should 
be free of legalistic procedures so that more people can use the system. 
In South Africa the CCMA is committed to informality. This is shown by the absence of complicated 
referral procedures when a complainant wants to report their dispute to mediation. This is to ensure 
that literacy and lack of skill are not barriers to the system. The only procedural requirements that an 
applicant has to fulfill are the two referral forms for conciliation and arbitration. Given the excessive 
number of cases referred to the CCMA and a high number of out-of-jurisdiction cases, this can be 
concluded that this excessive number of disputes referred to arbitration is largely due to the ease of 
access to the CCMA (Kwakwala, 2009).Both system seem to be informal. 
2.2.4 Costs 
The cost of the dispute resolution system is very important. Costs of dispute resolution involve the 
legal fees, order of costs and dispute resolution fees. Most dispute resolution systems are provided by 
governments as a service for their people. It is very important that a system should be free or afforda-
ble so that many people can be able to access it (Brand et al, 2008). 
In Botswana the dispute resolution system is provided by the government under the Ministry of La-
bour and Home Affairs and users are not expected to pay any fees. Section 29 of the Trade Disputes 
Act is very clear when it comes to the issue of cost at the Industrial Court, it provides no costs should 
be awarded unless a party has been identified by the court to have acted in a vexatious or fribulous 
manner. 
 According to Levy and Venter (2009) although the CCMA may make awards regarding to costs, gen-
erally commissioners are hesitant to make cost awards. Cost awards are only awarded in exceptional 
cases. These costs have the potential to scare away employees who cannot afford them. Both the 
Botswana and South Africa systems are free. 
2.2.5 Legitimacy 
 The legitimacy of a dispute resolution system entails such factors as; independence of institutions, 
professionalism of the providers, participation of stakeholders in the design of the system, delivery of 
just and fair decisions as well as clear and consistent decisions. 
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In Botswana the dispute resolution system is not independent as it is still operates within government. 
This is unlike most countries, for example South Africa, where the system has been separated from 
government and functions like an autonomous body.  
In the interviews carried out on labour relations experts in Botswana all the respondents pointed out 
that in order for the Botswana system to have legitimacy it has to be outside of government. The re-
spondents are of the view that when the system functions under government impartiality which is one 
of the pinnacles of any dispute resolution systems is going to be eroded. This is especially important 
since the Trade Disputes Act amendments of 2003 added public sector employees in the definition of 
an employee. This means that civil servants including mediators are free to report their disputes with 
the Trade Dispute Resolution Unit just like any other employee.  
In South Africa the CCMA is an independent statutory body with a governing body which is fully-
funded by the state. This means that although it receives money from government it is an autono-
mous body so it free from government influence. The CCMA has the power to license private agen-
cies and bargaining councils to perform any of its functions. This allows parties in dispute the choice 
of which institutions to use when they have a dispute (Bhorrat et al., 2007).In terms of legitimacy the 
South African dispute resolution has more legitimacy because it is independent and the providers of 
the system are seen to be more professional and better qualified. 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
The  comparison of the two systems have  revealed  a lot of similarities  as well as differences  which  
can be  help to identify where  one system is better than the other. In terms of the elements of the 
system although coverage and processes are similar there is a big difference in qualifications of the 
dispute resolution personnel and that the routing of disputes. As far as goals of a dispute resolution 
system are concerned the both system have been found to be affordable and informal but as for legit-
imacy, accessibility and efficiency the South Africa system is better that that of Botswana. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The dispute resolution systems of Botswana and South Africa depict noticeable similarities and differ-
ences. The South African labour dispute system is of a higher standard and complexity than the Bot-
swana system, so there are a lot of lessons that the Botswana system can learn from the South Afri-
can system.  
2. RECOMMENDATIONS  
2.1 Botswana 
2.1.1 Hiring full-time arbitrators 
Having a fully-staffed arbitration service can relieve the Industrial Court of the backlog it has been ex-
periencing over the years. The department should employ full-time arbitrators because the current 
full-time arbitrators have other jobs. My suggestion is that instead of hiring completely new people it is 
better to train the existing mediators who have more than five years‟ experience. This move is advan-
tageous because the Department can be sure that with experience gained from mediation   and the 
fact that they have been in the Department for a while will make it easier to adapt to arbitration rather 
than having completely new people. As for part-time arbitrators they are still needed since the value 
and experience they bring from the various labour relations areas they come from is vital for the de-
velopment of the dispute resolution in the country. 
2.1.2 Making arbitration a public hearing 
Although in South Africa the Labour Relations Act is silent on the issue of making arbitration a public 
hearing, by the virtue of the constitution being the principal law in the country it is a public hearing in 
line with section 34 of the Constitution of South Africa. Botswana must consider making arbitration 
hearing public like court adjudication because currently being private and confidential as it is, it un-
dermines the quality of arbitration awards as there is no public monitoring or control mechanism. 
However it may not be practical for public hearings so Botswana can rather concentrate on publishing 
arbitration awards so that they contribute to the development of law in the country. By making arbitra-
tion  a  public  hearing, it does not simply mean that  the general public would  be free to  physically 
attend arbitration hearings, it also means that  arbitration awards can be made public and thus devel-
op the case law. This will help to improve the quality and consistency of arbitration awards. 
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2.1.3 Establishment of a legislated mixed process of mediation-arbitration 
The Botswana authorities should look into creating a mixed process of mediation-arbitration as a 
measure of improving efficiency and reducing time taken in the dispute resolution system. This means 
that mediation and arbitration should be a continuous process, whereby arbitration follows immediate-
ly when mediation fails. This can ensure the expeditious resolution of trade disputes. This can only 
happen if full-time arbitrators are employed and the arbitration service is developed from its current 
form.  
In South Africa the provision for conciliation-arbitration was introduced by the August 2002 Labour 
Relations Act amendments in an attempt to expedite the dispute resolution process. The other party 
may object to con-arb but the process is compulsory on all dismissal and unfair labour practice dis-
putes involving probationary employees (Majinda, 2007). 
2.1.4 Making the dispute resolution system independent from government 
Botswana is probably the only country in southern Africa with a dispute resolution system which is still 
under government. According to interviewees who responded to interviews carried out by the re-
searcher this poses a number of problems including financial constraints since the department which 
houses dispute resolution will have to share the budget with other departments in the Ministry of La-
bour and Home Affairs and the dilemma of public sector who have to report to the system which their 
employers, government owns, this brings questions of impartiality. In the light of the above statements 
I strongly suggest that the time has come for Botswana to have an independent dispute resolution 
system. To add legitimacy to the process this can be done with the full participation of the tripartite 
partners. Government, business and trade unions will have to decide how the independent labour 
dispute resolution system should be. The governing council of this new independent body should be 
nominated by the tripartite partners. 
2.1.5 Recruitment of high qualified and experienced staff for mediation and arbitration 
Currently in Botswana people who are employed as mediators do not always have the appropriate 
qualifications. Most of them have degrees in Social Sciences and Human Resources Management. In 
order to improve the quality of mediation and arbitration prospective mediators and arbitrators should 
go through a rigorous  recruitment-selection and training programmes like in South Africa  where an 
individual starts work as a commissioner once  they have demonstrated competence on all the core  
training modules which include Conciliation Module I, Conciliation Module II, Arbitration I and Arbitra-
tion II, managing dismissal disputes and substantive law. This training goes on for six months and 
after completion the new commissioner will work under the guidance of an experienced commissioner 
for a while. 
2.1.6 Accreditation to Private agencies  
Currently the law in Botswana  is silent on the issue of accreditation of private agencies, although 
there are no institutions which are involved in private mediation and arbitration, there are individual 
private mediators and arbitrators who are not required by law to be accredited by the government but 
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it is important to have accreditation because the Department of Labour and Social Security can only 
credit  those  individuals or institutions that meet the standard  acceptable  standards of competence 
and if they fail to live up to the required standards  of competence  and behaviour the  Department of  
Labour can discredit them. 
2.1.7 Effective Case management system 
In Botswana mediators are overwhelmed with other duties such as registering disputes, administrative 
duties and following the up of the settlement certificate. In order to improve quality mediation there 
should be an effective case management system in which an officer who is not necessarily a mediator 
can do these administrative duties linked to mediation so that mediators only focus on mediating dis-
putes. These case managers should be in each District Labour office throughout the country and in 
bigger offices like Gaborone and Francistown they should be two so that they can be able to cope 
with the workload 
2.1.8 Proper routing of disputes 
In South Africa upon registration of a dispute its resolution path is prescribed by the statute. Several 
types of disputes come for conciliation at CCMA or bargaining councils, then after conciliation if these 
dispute remain unresolved they take slightly different routes. It is recommended that Botswana should 
have a system like that one of South Africa because it brings clarity on which disputes are supposed 
to be going where if mediation fails. The current practice is that if a dispute fails at the parties have to 
choose if they want it to go for arbitration or to the Industrial Court and if party objects to arbitration it 
must go to the Industrial Court. 
3. CONCLUSION 
 
In this research the Botswana dispute resolution system was compared with the South Africa system 
and the findings suggest that the Botswana system has much more to learn from the South Africa 
system. Although there marked similarities were identified, it was the differences identified that ex-
plained why the Botswana dispute resolution system is not as effective as the South African one. 
Chief among these differences is the independence of the dispute resolution system, in Botswana the 
system is still under government and this is problematic because it raises issues of impartiality espe-
cially as far as public sector employees are concerned. Botswana as a member of Southern African 
development Community (SADC) is a signatory to the charter of fundamental social rights in SADC 
signed in Tanzania on 26 August 2003.Among other things the Article 4,section (d) of the charter  
calls for member states to  have a dispute settlement machinery that is autonomous ,accessible 
,efficient and subject to tripartite  consultation. Compared to South Africa on these noble objectives 
the Botswana dispute resolution systems were found to be far behind in achieving them. 
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LIST OF STATUTES 
 
South Africa 
Industrial Conciliation Act No.11 of 1924   
Industrial Conciliation Amendment Act No.36 of 1937 
Native Labour settlement of Disputes Act No. 48 1953 or Black Labour Relations Regulation Act 
No.48 of 1953 
Industrial Conciliation Act No.28 of 1956 
Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act No.70 of 1973 
Black Labour Relations Regulation Amendment Act No.84 of 1977 
The Labour Relations Amendment Act No.57 of 1981  
Education Labour Relations Act No.146 of 1993  
Public Service Labour Relations Act No.102 of 1993  
Labour Relations Act No. 66 of 1995 
Botswana 
Constitution of Botswana 1966 
Employment Act of 1982 
Employment Act of 1992 
Employment Act of 2004 
The Employment Law (15 of 1963) 
The Trade Unions Act (24 of 1969) 
Trade Disputes act (28 of 1969) 
Trade Disputes Act of 1982 
Trade Disputes Act of 1992 
Trade Disputes Act of 2004  
Trade Unions and Employers Organisation Act (1983) 
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APPENDIX A-Interview Guide Line  
 
Date: 
Time:  
Place: 
Thank you for affording me the time to interview you. 
Name of the Interviewee: 
1. What are your  thoughts on  the effectiveness of the Botswana  labour dispute resolution sys-
tem?(Probe  here  what they think  is good  and what  needs  to be strengthened) 
2. Where would you like changes to be made? 
3.In your  opinion  what factors  contribute  to delays  in the effective  and efficient  resolution of  dis-
putes? 
4. How do you think these problems should be resolved? 
5. What do you   think are the roles that Government, employers and trade unions (employees) 
should play  in Labour Dispute Resolution? 
6.In an attempt  to reduce  the number  of cases  which  go to the external dispute resolution, what 
factors  could  be important in improving  the effectiveness of the internal dispute resolution  system? 
7.The Labour Dispute Resolution Unit  is located  in the Ministry  of Labour and Homed Affairs, what 
are your thoughts about this arrangement? 
8a.In your opinion what is the role of a mediator? 
8b.What qualifications do you think mediators should possess? 
9. In your opinion where in the dispute resolution process does legal representation become im-
portant? 
10a.Where do you think cases should be routed after mediation? 
 
10b.Currently there seems to be a high volume of cases routed to Industrial Court which is a lengthy 
and costly process. How do you think the speed of resolution of cases could be improved? 
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10c.If more cases were to be routed to arbitration what changes would be made? 
(Probe regarding clear demarcation of jurisdiction, existing capacity and extending the role of a medi-
ator to incorporate arbitration.) 
(Probe further as to whether they believe this will impact quality of the judgments made) 
11. What kind of lessons can be drawn from other labour relations dispute resolution systems 
throughout the world? 
12. In your opinion, which systems are best for us to learn from? 
13. As neighbours to South Africa, which is considered to have one of the best dispute resolution sys-
tems in the world, what lessons do you think can be drawn from them? 
14. Anything else you would like to add? 
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APPENDIX B- Introduction Letter and Informed Consent Forms 
 
 
 
 
THE LABOUR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
UNIT  
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY  
 
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY  
PORT ELIZABETH 6031  
 
 
September 2011 
 
INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
As a Masters student in Labour Relations and Human Resources in the Labour Relations and Hu-
man Resources Unit at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University I am required to conduct an inde-
pendent research project.  
The research project is an examination of the Botswana Dispute Resolution System and a compari-
son with the current South African system.   The proposed title of the treatise is “A comparison of the 
Botswana and South African Labour Dispute Resolution Systems”  
You are requested to participate in an interview. Your participation in terms of responding to any or all 
of the questions is VOLUNTARY.  
Could you please complete the section below which clearly indicates what level of confidentially and 
anonymity you would be comfortable with regarding the interview.  
Thank you for your time,  
 
Michael Koorapetse  
Master's student of Labour Relations and Human Resources  
 
 Yes  No  
In understand the nature of this research   
I voluntary consent to participation in this study    
I have a signed copy of this letter to keep    
I consent to the interview being recorded    
I consent to my name being used in the final treatise    
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I consent to my job title being used in the final treatise    
I consent to being referred to as Respondent “A, B etc ” in the final treatise    
 
Name: (please print) ________________________________________________________ 
Designation (please print) ____________________________________________________ 
Contact details: ____________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Signed: 
Date: _______________________ 
 
COPY to be left  
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THE LABOUR RELATIONS AND HUMAN RESOURCES 
UNIT  
DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRIAL AND ORGANISATIONAL 
PSYCHOLOGY  
NELSON MANDELA METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY  
PORT ELIZABETH 6031  
September 2011 
 
INTRODUCTION LETTER AND INFORMED CONSENT FORM 
 
As a Masters student in Labour Relations and Human Resources in the Labour Relations and Hu-
man Resources Unit at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University I am required to conduct an inde-
pendent research project.  
The research project is an examination of the Botswana Dispute Resolution System and a compari-
son with the current South African system.   The proposed title of the treatise is “A comparison of the 
Botswana and South African Labour Dispute Resolution Systems”  
You are requested to participate in an interview. Your participation in terms of responding to any or all 
of the questions is VOLUNTARY.  
Could you please complete the section below which clearly indicates what level of confidentially and 
anonymity you would be comfortable with during the interview.  
Thank you for your time,  
 
Michael Koorapetse  
Master's student of Labour Relations and Human Resources  
 
 Yes  No  
In understand the nature of this research   
I voluntary consent to participation in this study    
I have a signed copy of this letter to keep    
I consent to the interview being recorded    
I consent to my name being used in the final treatise    
I consent to my job title being used in the final treatise    
I consent to being referred to as Respondent “A, B or C etc ” in the final trea-
tise  
  
 
Name: (please print) _______________________________________________________ 
Designation (please print) ___________________________________________________ 
Signed:  
Date: ______________________ 
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LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
 
8 September 2011  
Michael Koorapetse is a mediator with the Botswana Labour Dispute Resolution Unit situated in the 
Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs. Michael Koorapetse is currently a coursework Masters student 
in the Labour Relations and Human Resources Unit at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University in 
Port Elizabeth, South Africa. 
 As part fulfillment of the master‟s programme he is required to produce a research treatise. The re-
search area that he has chosen compares the Labour Dispute Resolution systems in Botswana and 
South Africa and explores means of strengthening these systems. The proposed title of the treatise is 
“A comparison of the Botswana and South African Labour Dispute Resolution systems”  
The research requires that Michael conduct a number of interviews with individuals who are knowl-
edgeable regarding the Botswana Dispute Resolution system. The results are published as a master‟s 
treatise and will become part of the international library system. However, the names of the persons 
need not be mentioned. You are asked to indicate on the attached consent form your preferred level 
of anonymity.  
As the UNIT we can give reassurances of confidentially and as a student of the Unit, Michael Koo-
rapetse is bound by these rules of confidentiality when dealing with any information. Before embark-
ing on a project, students are required to sign a confidentiality agreement.     
If you have any queries or concerns regarding the above please contact the undersigned.  
 
Yours faithfully  
Jennifer Bowler  
Co-ordinator Masters programme  
Labour Relations and Human Resources Unit,  
Department of Industrial and Organizational Psychology  
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University  
Email address Jennifer.Bowler@nmmu.ac.za  
Telelphone: 027 41 5042362  
Cell:  0834635285  
Co-signed:  
 
Michael Koorapetse  
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